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Abstract
The market leadership by enterprises that actuate in the market is increasingly as a main
objective. This position of the company allows superior levels of profitability and stability
of future revenues. Although, the high competition that is felt in the world markets and
the political turmoil thicken this task of the firm to maintain the front position in the
future, leading to a search of potential solutions. Inside of this set of alternatives, the
corporate espionage might be preferable. The choice of this solution is more and more
frequent, where the scandals and espionage activities are performed by largest companies.
The uncertainty, flexibility and irreversibility corroborate the use of Real Options
Approach with the aim of calculate the optimal timing to incur in espionage, for a specific
optimal level of these operations. On the first stage of the model, we assume that the
company, as an individual agent, decides to use these activities for maximizing its value.
However, the maximization of the value of the firm deteriorates the social welfare, which
leads to the active attitude of the regulator in order to determinate the social optimal
timing to the occurrence of espionage actions, as well as define the differences between
the efficient and social optimal moment. To combat the incentives of efficient solution in
relation to social equilibrium, the state might intervene via suppliers or consumers.
The results of this study demonstrate that the cost structure of the production and
espionage postpone the optimal decision of incurring in espionage, while the production
cost disparities between the firms anticipates the performance of these actions. The
expected probability of success or the intensity of these operations is only affected by
the level of uncertainty surrounding the market. However, the firm detains incentives to
decide efficiently instead of securing the social interests. To protect the social welfare,
the regulator might apply a system of consuming subsidies or finance the defence of the
competitive vantage of the peer.
The theoretical evidence founded throughout the model allowed a significant
contribution to the literature, once it is one of the first model that does not state a
fixed position concerned with social implications of espionage, i.e., the timing to incur in
these activities determines if espionage is beneficial or harmful for the society.
Key-Words:Real Options, Corporate Espionage.
JEL Codes:G11; G13; O16.
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Resumo
A lideranc¸a dos mercados por parte das empresas que o disputam e´ cada vez mais
um objetivo primordial. Este posicionamento permite a` empresa elevados n´ıveis de
rentabilidade e de estabilidade de receitas futuras. Contudo, a elevada competic¸a˜o que
se faz sentir nos mercados mundiais e a conjuntura pol´ıtica e financeira dificulta a tarefa
das mesmas em manter a sua posic¸a˜o esta´vel, levando-as a procurar soluc¸o˜es estrate´gicas
diversificadas. Dentro deste conjunto de alternativas, a espionagem industrial pode ser
uma delas. A escolha desta soluc¸a˜o tem sido cada vez mais frequente, onde os escaˆndalos e
atividades de espionagem sa˜o desempenhadas por grandes empresas do nosso quotidiano.
A incerteza, a flexibilidade e a irreversibilidade da espionagem justificam o uso de
um modelo de Opc¸o˜es Reais com o objetivo de determinar o momento o´timo de realizar
estas atividades, para um determinado n´ıvel o´timo de sucesso destas operac¸o˜es. Numa
primeira fase, e´ assumido que a empresa, como agente individual, decide o uso deste
tipo de atividades com o intuito de maximizar o seu valor. Pore´m, esta maximizac¸a˜o
deteriora o bem-estar social, o que leva a` participac¸a˜o ativa do regulador para determinar
o momento socialmente o´timo para a sua realizac¸a˜o, bem como determina as disparidades
em relac¸a˜o a` decisa˜o eficiente da empresa. Como forma de combater estas diferenc¸as na
ocorreˆncia o´tima de espionagem, o estado pode intervir via produtores ou consumidores.
Os resultados deste estudo demonstram que a estrutura de custos operacionais ou de
espionagem atrasam a ocorreˆncia deste tipo de atividades. Por outro lado, a disparidade
de custos entre as diferentes empresas antecipa a realizac¸a˜o das mesmas. O n´ıvel de
sucesso ou a intensidade destas operac¸o˜es apenas e´ afetado pelo n´ıvel de risco do mercado.
Todavia, a empresa tem incentivos a decidir eficientemente em detrimento dos interesses
sociais, o que leva o estado a aplicar subs´ıdios ao consumo ou o financiamento da defesa
da vantagem competitiva da concorreˆncia.
As evideˆncias teo´ricas encontradas ao longo do modelo permitem tambe´m uma
contribuic¸a˜o significativa para a literatura, uma vez que consiste num dos primeiros
estudos que na˜o defende uma posic¸a˜o fixa no que concerne a`s implicac¸o˜es da espionagem
na sociedade, ou seja, o momento de realizac¸a˜o das operac¸o˜es determina se a espionagem
e´ socialmente bene´fica ou nefasta.
Palavras-Chave:Opc¸o˜es Reais, Espionagem Industrial.
Classificaes JEL: G11; G13; O16.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The world economic environment is, in most industries and countries, increasing with the
competition and each firm tries to fight with all the tools to lead the markets, in innovation
and profitability. The global competition, the flexible currency and international markets,
the political turmoil, the uncertainty behind the country recession reinforce and boost the
pressure of the market (Vashisth and Kumar, 2013). This position in the market is not
accomplished only to the high level of efficiency in the company. The larger amount of
information about the market as a whole and the behaviour of each competitor/firm that
can have a direct or indirect effect in the position of a specific company can lead into
a unique position to strategically decide what the best action to incur. Commonly, the
strategic unit of the company should decide how the company intervene in the market
and balance the use or not of these activities.
Sarangi et al. (2010) argues that the systematic and ethical approach of a specific
company to gather, analyse and monitor information that can affect the firm’s plans,
decisions and operations performed by the legal competitive intelligence business actions is
insufficient. It is required a deeper level of specific information in order to gain a significant
advantage in relation to others firms. Thus, with the aim of achieving a larger amount of
information about the competitive environment, the company shelves the ethical values
that can sustain the activity. This fall leads to a blurring in the intelligence activity of the
company, being difficult to understand the threshold between the ethical and legal activity
and the illegal actions powered by the firm. This information and its collection need to
be pre-emptive of any event and decision. Only in that situation it can be favourable
to the firm. Thus, as decision process pre-dated the possible move of the competitor,
the real threat for the company , industrial espionage might be taken into consideration
(Solan and Yariv, 2004). This questionable method of gathering information via illegal
and unethical means can lead to a better performance and to maintain the competitive
edge (Vashisth and Kumar, 2013).
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The first known case dates back to XVIII century, where Pe`re D’Entrcolles monitors
the manufacture process of Chinese Porcelain, meticulously (Finlay, 2010). After that, the
number of corporate espionage attacks are becoming larger, being nowadays, situations
that happen frequently. Almost 8.5 billion of dollars is how much the American Companies
bear annually due to the costs of espionage (Chen, 2016). The method also is more
advanced than before (based on the observation and the technical contact) and now in
actions like waste sifting (dumpster diving), surveillance devices installation, (Vashisth
and Kumar, 2013). The case of spying activities of Proctor and Gamble Company in
2001 are an example of this development. In order to obtain information about the direct
competitor Unilever PLC, they decided to search in the shredded documents (Vashisth
and Kumar, 2013).
However, the espionage is well-known by the companies since the beginning. Even
Boulton and Watt, in XVIII century, knew that any company or other scientist could
steal their knowledge and information about the steam engine invention (Birch, 1955).
Also, Opel division of General Motors Corporations knew that the inclusion of former
employees in a direct competitor, Volkswagen Group, might have as a principle the sharing
of their knowledge, in 1993 (Vashisth and Kumar, 2013). Sarangi et al. (2010) states the
awareness of the possibility of being victim of espionage by other related enterprises.
The understanding of this reality lead the companies to fortify their defences against such
attacks. These attempts by the companies are sometimes useless against a complex spying
strategy. Although, and taking specific circumstances, the victim might not prevent such
actions of the competition or other firms. Sometimes, the insider threat is a reality and
the company is not able to prevent these actions. Hewlett-Packard Company already had
cases with this characteristics.
The ethical and legal perspective in espionage comprehends a critical importance to
the society. However, the growing concern about the effects of espionage might injure the
long run perspectives of a company, or even a country, (Sarangi et al., 2010).
The importance of the industrial espionage is also highlighted by the macroeconomic
study of Cozzi and Spinesi (2006). According to them, the corporate espionage
deteriorates positive effect created by the R&D activities of the enterprise, and allows
a higher differentiation in the products develop in specific market. This differentiation
result of the weakening process of the R&D activities, that could boost the economic
growth. This study corroborates the conclusions obtained previously by Cozzi (2001).
Taking into consideration the implication for the economic growth of the spying activities,
Cozzi (2001) was able to explain that the implications of the incentives to spy increase
as the number of skilled employees rise. This kind of behaviour, in the opinion of Cozzi
(2001), enables a quick process of diffusion in the economy. Segerstrom (1991) already
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tried to study the impact of these activates. According to him, the imitation process is an
interaction between a leader in a product with a high level of quality that will be copied
by other enterprise in order to decrease the amounts of profits. However, this behaviour
is more common when the process of innovation is less costly, i.e., when the process of
innovation is higher, the firms will focus on their products and decrease the amount of
espionage.
As it is possible to realize, the economic environment that different enterprises are
facing shows the need for them in searching for solutions. However, in what concerns to
the theoretical evidence, the scope of espionage activities is quite scant. The managerial
and economic implications of such activity are not much studied, which is a challenge
for the present study. Based on the established literature gap, the aim of this study is
to develop a model able to study the optimal timing for the firm to incur in espionage
operations.
As soon as the start of espionage activities is decided, the consequences of such
action are irreversible, with an influence in the profitability and sustainability of the spy
corporation also for the market. The impact of such activity is also uncertain, i.e., the
influence of espionage in the future of the company is quite unpredictability. Although,
the company, specially the managers of the enterprise, are quite flexible to choose when
it is more beneficial to carry out these activities.
These three characteristics of the managers’ decision validates the Real Options
Approach as the method for our model. The determination of the optimal timing to
spy is based on the option to espionage, i.e., the manager has the right, but not the
obligation of incurring in such activities (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
However, the efficiency of this decision is not a guarantee of the equity for the society.
The enforcement of these operations might not bring benefits for the different agents in the
market. In order to guarantee the maximization of the welfare of the society, is required
the intervention, implicit or explicit, of the government. The inclusion of a regulator
goes according the empirical evidence, with the aim of ensuring that the interests of the
society are taken into consideration. Thus, we also decide to develop the optimal moment
of espionage for the enterprise, but with the guarantee of social equity, at the expense of
profit’s maximization.
The reminder of this dissertation is structured as follows. The following chapter
presents the literature review of the main topics of the report, namely the espionage
approaches and the different economical implications of theses operations. Chapter 3
presents the efficient model of the decision of the company to incur in spy actions and
its implications. Chapter 4 exhibits the social decision model of the occurrence of spy
actions, its implications and different instruments that allow the equality between the
3
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efficient and social solution. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation, presenting the main
contributions and conclusions of both models, and possible topics for future research.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Espionage
”There is no place where
Espionage is not possible.”
Sun Tzu (V century BC), Art of
War
2.1 Definition
The position of a company in a specific industry is increasingly important. Sarangi
et al. (2010) denotes that corporate espionage is a comprehensive concept that embraces
activities related with the theft of proprietary information. To Vashisth and Kumar
(2013), industrial espionage an organization or a specific corporation must comprehend the
actions of acquiring private information (classified or confidential), without any knowledge
or permission of other company from which information belongs. This information can be
part of the most fundamental parts of the output production (techniques, costs, recipes or
formulas, levels of quality in raw materials), strategic plan (actions or companys decision,
timetables of the next steps, business plans), customer relationship (customer databases,
pricing list, marketing strategies) and R&D process about the spied competitors (Vashisth
and Kumar, 2013; Barrachina et al., 2014). According to Kish-Gephart et al. (2010),
this behaviour that widely violate the accepted moral norms and illegal acquisitions of
information can be also described as the act of collect and manage sensitive information
of the competitors to gaining or maintaining a competitive edge in the market (Vashisth
and Kumar, 2013).
Nowadays, the espionages attacks are more concentrated in immaterial assets.
According to Cozzi and Spinesi (2006), the fundamental and critical assets are immaterial/
intangible and this kind of assets are easily stolen than traditional/physical factors. These
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authors also argue that the critical assets able to misappropriation are those which can
bring economic benefits to their authors but the property right is not yet established.
Quah (1999) also emphasizes this aspect. The increasingly importance of intangible
assets has been highlighted in the last decade, due to the easiness of stealing this kind
of information, which in most cases is worth millions of dollars. Sarangi et al. (2010)
emphasizes that industries that based its activity in this kind of assets, such as high-tech,
pharmaceutical and drugs, defence related industry are more subject to this type of
activities.
2.2 Why Companies Spy?
The espionage act sometimes covers a wide range of strategies that spying companies
possess in that moment. Barrachina et al. (2014) states some of them after citing
some newspapers articles about the subject. The cost advantages are one of them, once
that the spying behaviour is more favourable, in some industries, that the research and
development of the specific products and also it is necessary to take into consideration
the cost related to the time necessary to perform R&D activities. This cost embraces
the time that company would need to reach the development stage that observes in the
competitors. Whitney and Gaisford (1999) states that the reduction of R&D expenses
due to the economic espionage leads to direct benefits to the company, but it does not
change the corporate strategy of the company, once that the strategy of the firm will
remain unchanged. Sarangi et al. (2010) also highlights the role of economies of scope in
order to motivate spy activities. When it happens a fall in the cost due to the production
of more than one product (the benefit of knowledge across markets), the level of espionage
is only determined by the costs of such operation (qualitative equilibrium specified by the
cost). These authors also study the non-existence of economic benefits of diversification.
According to a specific scenario of diseconomies of scope, companies will not undertake spy
activities even when the intelligence cost is zero. The company, under this circumstances
prefers to be spied by the peers.
Vashisth and Kumar (2013) also emphasize this reason as primordial to the spying act
of a firm. They state that the bribery of an employee with the aim of stealing information
is less costly than the development of a new product line with a larger investment in R&D.
The insider threat is seen, by this authors, as an important area of industrial espionage.
Cozzi (2001) also highlights this kind of behaviour inside the company, which justify the
larger portion of the attacks in that time. According to him, the skilled-workers owns
expertise about the subject/innovation process and try to reveal it to the competitors of
the firm that have generating it. This kind of behaviour explains the espionage attacks
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suffered by Hewlett-Packard in 2006, that ended with the resignation of the chairman of
the company, Patricia Dunn. Also, some of them, taking into attention Bhide´ (2003),
takes this information and initiate its own company. This kind of behaviour, i.e., the
replication on the modification of an idea encountered in their previous employment is
responsible for the creation of 71% of the Inc.500s companies in 2000 (a list of young
fast-growing firms).
Related to the costs of R&D and the production cost are the government subsidies for
innovation or imitation. According to Segerstrom (1991), an increase in the innovation
subsidy of the government increase the steady-state intensity of the imitation effort of
each competitor (i.e. cheaper innovation implies a faster rate of imitation). The opposite
situation also happens. An increase of government subsidy for imitation activity, each
company will increase the innovations activity.
Another possible explanation related with the cost advantages is the production
method of the company. Whitney and Gaisford (1999) study the case of spying activity
between two worldwide airline corporations, where one of them spies the other in order
to replicate the same technology with a lower level of costs. According to these authors,
the production process or methodology induces two kinds of benefits to the company;
strategic benefits resulted from the lower marginal cost, and also direct benefits due to
the fall in the total costs of the company. According to Vashisth and Kumar (2013),
this information can be used as a foundation to the innovation process of the company.
Directly related with this reason is the ease of imitation, according to Segerstrom (1991),
corporations should expect difficulties in the invention of a product/technology. But, in
what concerns to the imitation, the ease of companies can imitate new products affect
the incentives to imitate and innovate.
The enhance of the quality can also substantiate such happening (Sarangi et al., 2010).
According to this study, spying activities can be motivated by the desire of the enterprise
to improve the quality of the product. By this activity, the enterprise take notice about the
rivals product, process and marketing operations. The improve of such characteristics of
the product is impinged in the market by a boost of the companys market share. Sarangi
et al. (2010) states that the spying activity or even the investment will intrinsically lead
to a rise of the demand which implicitly increase the prices.
Barrachina et al. (2014) also addresses the market position to motivate spying
activities. Depending from comparing who is spying who, the result in the market can
be the increase of the markets power for some companies (if the spy is one of the major
companies) or also the increase in the competition (if the small size companies try to
observe the actions of the best players in the market). These authors, through their
models give a related statement to this topic. Based on the entrant of a competitor in a
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monopoly market , their study state that (Barrachina et al., 2014, p.129):
When the IS (Intelligence System) accuracy is known only to the entrant
and this information is very asymmetric, market competition is increased since
the entrant is more likely to enter.
So, when the asymmetry of information is favourable to the smaller companies or
the companies that try to enter in the market, the possibility of increasing the market
competition is larger. The rising level of competition can lead to better condition for
customer, once that, as the increase of the competition, the market price decreases and
the market output rise. This intuition leads to the increase of the customer surplus
(Barrachina et al., 2014). The theft of information concerned with the market position
of the company as contract bids, marketing plans, can rise strategic benefits in the global
markets but no direct benefits (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999). Vashisth and Kumar (2013)
also states that the information obtained might not be to the increase of the markets role
of the company who spy, but to deteriorate the market position of the spied firm. The
market environment can also justify the decision of spying or investing to the company,
according to Segerstrom (1991). The author argues that in a single-leader industry, the
company should imitate rather than investing, while in a two-leader in the market, the
company, taking into consideration its profitability, should invest/innovate.
Another pertinent question can be the company safety. Taking into consideration the
model of Barrachina et al. (2014) the entrant, in general terms, enters in the market if the
monopolist (incumbent) does not invest in the expansion. Thus, in order to protect the
sustainability, the entrant needs to know what the incumbent will do next. According to
the study of Segerstrom (1991), it is possible to identify another related reason to motivate
the economic espionage: the success of others firms, mainly peers. This company is
attracted by these profits, and thus, develop the R&D and the production of new products.
However, some companies are not prepared, so they spy the successful corporations in
order to take ideas about how they can design the new products. The motivation can also
be not only the success of a brand, but also its power and dominance in the market. We
can designate this effect as placebo effect, where a company very well-established in the
market and with a strong brand is spied only because this dominance in the market.
2.3 The Presence of Spying Activities in the
Literature
Industrial espionage endures in the human history since the beginning of the corporate
activity. The effects or the process behind the spy activity are not extensively studied
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in the literature. According to Chen (2016) the models behind the espionage activity
can be incorporated in two categories, Non-Noisy Signal Model or Noisy-Signal Model.
The difference, according to Chen (2016) is in the relevance of information quality and
confidence. In the first typology, the models assume a binary condition to the information
and the spying activity. In case of success, the information is assembled via espionage
intelligence are always correct, independent of the conditions of the spy activity. In the
case of failure, the information is not obtained, incurring into a sunk cost. The study
of Matsui (1989) is encompassed on this trend. Based on a two-player repeated game,
the adaptation or the breach on the prevailing market conditions are dependent on the
myopic vision of other players actions.
Whitney and Gaisford (1999) also analyse the impact of corporate espionage based
on this approach. The duopoly competition between two airline enterprises supported by
the Domestic Government robust the developed study of this phenomena. According to
this study, the incurrence of the monitorization of competitor activity is aimed by the
technologic transfer and the human capital/knowledge behind the level of costs bear out
by the peer. The Intelligence System accuracy is public which results in a random success
or failure of the IS outcome.
Sarangi et al. (2010) emphasizes the importance of spying activity la Cournot, with an
independence of the information quality. More specifically, these authors argue that the
information provided by the spying activity is prior to the competition in the market. In a
first stage of the model, companies decid the total amount of espionage. In a second stage,
firms play a two-market Cournot Game, with inter-related cost between both markets.
The Noisy Signal models denotes another relevant topic in the occurrence of this
activity, the valuation of the information received by the intelligence activities. In this
typology, the models recognize the noisy signals received by the espionage activity, defining
the level of accuracy of this method.
Solan and Yariv (2004) valuate the spy activity according to the this type. These
two authors try to elucidate the advantages or the modifications if one player (based on
two-player-game) can purchase noisy information about his opponent decision. Through
Game Theory Approach, specifically based on a one-shot-game or a two-stage sequential
game, this study explains that espionage is costly and provides a noisy signal of the spied
company decisions, might leading to a profitability of the spy company. If it is common
knowledge, the espionage activities cross the advantages of both players.
Provan (2008), based on this approach compute the effect of espionage in the process
of entry deterrence. The entry deterrence, in other words, the decision process of the
entrant to initiate its activity in some market based on the industry conditions, is one of
the most discussed topics. Based on linear programming approach and with an interaction
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between two agents with a non-value creation (zero sum game), this author states a
different solution of the previous one.
Barrachina et al. (2014) investigate also this subject and the effects of espionage in
the decision. Through a Game Theory approach, the authors explain the decision process
of the entrant based on the signal-jam received by the IS that monitors the monopolist
decision of investing in an expansion or not. According to that, the entrant only benefits
from the spying activities if the IS accuracy is high and the level of accuracy is known only
by them. If this happens, the entrant enters in the market with a high probability which
increase the market competition. If the IS accuracy is common knowledge, the incumbent
can manipulate the signals emitted which can distorted the trust of the entrant in this
system, which worst the entrant position.
Biran and Tauman (2009) also focused in this topic, but related with the role of the
intelligence in nuclear deterrence. To these authors, the espionage and the monitorization
of the competitors actions are unique and fundamental.
Barrachina et al. (2014) cite Mezzanine Group (2010) as a real illustration of this
situation. Most of the companies research and monitor the behaviour of other competitors
with the assistance of a market research firm (e.g. Mezzanine Group). According to this
study, a possible entrant in energy market in Ontario is assisted by this kind of firms.
So, the consulting company evaluate the competitive landscape of the geographical space,
and some of the information given were the incumbent companies strategies to the area.
Another important aspect of spying is the possibility of this activity being manipulated
and being sold for the best proposal. Ho (2008) studies this phenomenon, describing as
double crossing events. According to her study, the spying activity is based on the rational
and strategic decision, so the possibility of double crossing is real. This paper emphasizes
the possibility the possibility of information can be sold for the rivals companies.
2.4 The role of Espionage in the Society
Economic or Industrial Espionage is possible through a range of military technologies
and others behaviours or tools that can re-establish the balance or also increase the
industrials disparities. Thus, espionage has the possibility of changing the status quo of
an industry being able to create desirable effects and/or profit-shifting effects in very
restricted markets. But also, is an unethical and illegal activity (Barrachina et al.,
2014). Cozzi (2001) also states a social benefit role of industrial espionage, in a certain
level of espionage. In a specific level, corporate spying can lead to a quick diffusion
of the idea in the market (taking into consideration the intangibles assets idea), which
can rush new products development. Solan and Yariv (2004), through a Game Theory
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approach, specifically through chain-store examples, where both players can access to
espionage activities or only one can do it, discovered a efficiency improvement based on
espionage activities, for a low cost of information. In other words, if the espionage is very
cheap, it can lead to a Pareto improvement. Whitney and Gaisford (1999) states a social
improvement caused by the espionage. Taking into consideration state espionage if both
countries spy each other, it is possible an enhance of the economic conditions due to the
technological transfer that is implicit with espionage. Also, consumers will be better off.
For the companies, these two authors defend that economic espionage can have direct
benefits, resulted from the access to valuable economic secrets, but also another kind of
benefits. The common shift profits provide a common objective to the company.
For Crane (2005), the illegal acquisition of information is not favourable to the
commercial interest of the source organizations and it also against the public interests.
Mike McConnel, Michael Chertoff and William Lyn in 20121 also emphasizes the bad
effects of industrial espionage in the market. According to this newspaper article, the quick
growth of economic espionage can cause long-term injuries to the companies, damaging
the competitor business drastically. For example, the Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage from Organization for Research
Integrity stated that the economic espionage costs almost $100 to $250 billion in lost
sales, in 2000 only to US Business Community.
The enhance of quality provided by the spying activities, according to Sarangi et al.
(2010), might not bring beneficial repercussions to the social welfare and the consumer.
The efficiency in the operational costs afforded by the espionage for the spy activity do
not directly translate into a social welfare improvement.
In what concerns to the spy company, with its announcement, the credibility and the
reputation is compromised, losing the organization and corporates integrity (Vashisth and
Kumar, 2013). Also, as a consequence, the next negotiations can be seriously injured once
that the partners or even the peers can hesitate to do business with this firm or also in
entering in a specific market due to the fear of being spied. According to Winkler (1997),
organizations should take efforts for preventing this kind of behaviour and also personnel,
physical, technical and operational actions. This fair and ethical environment can help
all the agents in the market. To Cozzi (2001), the spying activity socially deteriorates the
redistribute activities, if the marginal benefit of spying is too large in comparison to the
innovation. This author also states that the maintenance of a social environment that
emphasize the innovation can be extremely difficult.
In spite of being notorious the different positions pondered by the previous referred
1http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178832338032176.html (accessed
20.11.2016)
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articles, Chen (2016), conclude an ambiguous effect in the consumer welfare. This
statement is originated by the opposition of two effects, the technology transfer and the
effect of the of the cost reduction investment. In other words, the espionage reduces the
costs but it creates a positive effect to the costumer, appointed as technologic transfer
effect by Whitney and Gaisford (1999), and one negative, related with the reduction in
the investment focused in the reduction of the cost. The expected effect comes from the
dominant effect of both.
The debate between the pros and cons against espionage highlights the importance
of regulation in the corporate intelligence activities (Sarangi et al., 2010). Also, the
heterogeneous equilibrium between what efficiently and what socially matters, i.e., the
equilibrium level can be different from the social optimal level, imposing the pertinence
of regulatory intervention.
But in the other hand, what is the main implications to the policy makers? Should
be banned or it can provoque good effects? (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999).
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Chapter 3
Firm’s Decision to Spy
”Access to secret intelligence is
one of the more potent
aphrodisiacs of power.”
David Stafford, 1949 -
3.1 Introduction
We could start to describe our perspective of espionage by Once upon a time, such as any
fictional story due to the blockbusters surrounding spy activities, as James Bond, Evelin
Salt, or even in a more comic perspective, Johnny English. Although, the espionage
actions affect the companies reality, and it is not a complex situation in the small
or medium size companies, but in the largest companies that actuate in the different
competitive industries. Cases such as Hilton Hotels & Resorts versus Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide Inc., Mattel Inc. versus MGA Entertainment Inc. and Motorola Inc.
versus Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd show us that the scandals and the spying activities
are performed by those which are too big to fail1.
The reality of espionage is transversal to any particular activity. The demand for
a competitive advantage or even the search to increase it prompt the companies to
overcome the ethical and cultural boundaries, incurring in spy actions. However, as we
said before, the economic rationality shows us that this operation can be healthy in the
competitive context (Solan and Yariv, 2004; Vashisth and Kumar, 2013).The spy actions
of Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW AG) to Autolib, the hiring of former General
Motors Corporations employees by Volkswagen Group in order to share particular secrets
of the production operations of the rival and the disclosed confidential information by the
1http://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/10-casos-de-espionagem-industrial/
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designer of Gillette (Procter and Gamble Company Brand) to its peers, Warner-Lambert
(Pfizer Inc. acquired company), Socit BIC S.A and American Safety Razor Company
demonstrate that espionage implies an economic rationality between the costs and the
benefits of such operation, that could rebalance the competition and reduce the industrys
costs2.
3.2 The Model
Let start to consider a duopoly market, where two enterprises, based on a similarity in the
costs and in homogeneous products that offered, share the market equally (Whitney and
Gaisford, 1999). The spy cases of Procter & Gamble Company versus Unilever Group,
Coca-Cola Company versus PespsiCo Inc. and Airbus SAS versus Boeing Company
empirically state that in the context of oligopolistic industries (specifically duopoly) with
larger entry barriers and high levels of R&D push the companies to use any mean to create
a competitive advantage. In our first perspective, we will consider a specific company, S,
acting in a duopoly market which has the option to spy its rival, R. The tracing of such
spying strategy only happens due to a harmful situation that company S faces, i.e., S
recognizes that, in a normal situation and without any structural shift in demand, the
marginal production costs, c, are equal between them and constant which implies an equal
partition of the market. But ex ante, S knows that R possesses a cost adavantage that
allow this company to produce to lower costs, which compromises this situation.
On the consumers perspective, their preferences and taste assume a linear relation
between the markets price, P, and the total quantity available, in the market, given by
the sum of outputs of both competitors (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999; Azevedo et al.,
2016).
P = a− b(QS +QR) (3.1)
Where a represents the constant, b the slope of the function while QS and QR shows
the total amount produced by S and R.
As we mentioned before, R suffered an exogenous positive improvement that affects
the balance the market, and specifically the production costs. This shock concentrates in
an improvement of its technology, the production methods or even the strategic plans of R,
that enables this company to be one step ahead of the competition, and therefore, produce
to a lower marginal cost, c−δ. The marginal cost reduction, δ, translates a single, discrete
and individual advantage that allow company R to collect direct and strategic benefits
from this market, through a larger level of and a larger set of clients. In opposition, S
faces a harmful situation, with a deterioration of its profit’s level.
2https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2011-09-20/famous-cases-of-corporate-espionage
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Taking into consideration the new cost structure of the company and since the market
does not record any other exogenous shift in demand, the profit and the total output
amount produced by both companies change, being the company R in better position
that company S, with a higher profit to R. The market also improves with lower price
and larger consumer surplus.
Symmetric Costs Cost Advantage of R
cR = c > cR = c− δ
cS = c = cS = c
QS =
a− c
3b
> QS =
a− c− δ
3b
QR =
a− c
3b
< QR =
a− c+ 2δ
3b
piS =
(a− c)2
9b
> piS =
(a− c− δ)2
9b
piR =
(a− c)2
9b
< piR =
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
P =
a+ 2c
3
> P =
a+ 2c− δ
3
Table 3.1: Productivity and Profitability Levels of the Market for a symmetric market
structure of the cost, c, and for an advantage of R.
These two described states elucidate the market situation that occurs exogenously, i.e.,
S can not prevent anything to happen and it only can ease the effects of such improvement
of R’s production. The possible action that can commit is espionage once that the current
situation, is harmful to its level of profitability. Thus, S needs to compete equally and be
able to entry in the market. Managers and administration plan to consider spy activities
with the goal of understanding what is the main secret advantage of R and implemented
in the productive process.
In this first model, R has a passive attitude because it is assumed that it can not
do anything to block the spy attacks of S. On the other hand, S has knowledge
about the asynchronous process of espionage and the inlay of Rival’s advantage in their
productive process, i.e.S knows that exists three distinct periods. First, the conduction
of espionage activities, followed by the disclosure of the results of such actions. Lastly,
the Cournot Duopoly Game performed by both companies. The knowledge of the order
and the different steps of the process allow S to antecipate the subsequent play of the
Duopoly Game when invests in espionage. Therefore, it allows the model to be calculated
backwards (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999).
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Figure 3.1: The Time Line of the Events, adapted from Whitney and Gaisford (1999)
The success or the failure of the spying activities are dependent by the parameter p,
know as the penetration rate as in Whitney and Gaisford (1999). The penetration rate
measures the quality of the spy attempts, or the probability of S incorporates the positive
advantage in the productive process. In this way, p translates the success of spy actions
of S to acquire the advantage of R, whereas 1 − p captures the failure of their actions.
In case of success, the company S acquire the vantage of the company R and apply it
in the productive process, which leads to a fall in the marginal cost to the same level of
company R, c− δ. In this case, both companies share the market equally again, in terms
of quantity and profit, i.e., they become symmetric again. With a successful attempt of
espionage activity, the enterprise S will be able to recover or earn an extra profit flow,
provided form the higher produced amount. The penetration rate also can also determine
the total of information acquired by the production process of R.
In case of failure, S remains producing at a marginal cost of c and the company R
produces to a better situation, c − δ. It is relevant also to refer that, in this we do not
consider any cost resulting from the failure of the spying attempt of the company S, in
what concerns to public embarrassment or other kind of reputation costs. We assume that
in the case of failure, company R knows that it was spied but it does not know who was
responsible for this. The cyber attack in 2006 to a set of 70 companies, governments and
non-profit organizations that some companies traced the possibility of being conducted
by Chinese authorities can sustain this assumption3.
In Table 3.2 we present both states provided by the failure or the sucess of spy actions,
based on a Cournot Duopoly Game. As it is possible to see, the sucess of the spy actions
and the inlay of the R’s benefic features in S’s production allows S to decrease its costs
and simetrically split the market with R, in what concerns to the output and the level
of profit. In case of failure, S and R split the market based in the cost difference with a
advantage position to R, being its the costs of both companies intact, as it is shown in
Table 3.2.
The assumption that a−c−δ is strictly positive allow us to realize that S will produce
3https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2011-09-20/famous-cases-of-corporate-espionage
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in each unfavourable situation, even with a significant cost’s difference between R and S
(Whitney and Gaisford, 1999).
The swift between both the cost’s structure of S between the two states translates
into a improvement of S’s output , 2δ
3b
, and a profit disparity of 4δ(a−c)
9b
. In the case of R,
the production is reduced in δ
3b
and the profit fell
2δ(a−c+ 3
2
)δ
9b
.
Unsuccessful
Spy Action
Success Spy
Action
Espionage
Impact
Occurrence’s Probability 1− p p
Output Produced by S a−c−δ
3b a−c+δ
3b
+2δ
3b
Output Produced by R a−c+2δ
3b
− δ
3b
Profit for S (a−c−δ)
2
9b (a−c+δ)2
9b
+4δ(a−c)
9b
Profit for R (a−c+2δ)
2
9b
−2δ(a−c+ 32 )δ
9b
Table 3.2: State Contingent Cournot-Nash Duopoly Outcomes for each state of Espionage
Activities’ results
3.2.1 Optimal Spy Equilibrium
Let us consider that the profit flows of both companies evolve randomly, being affected by
X as a multiplicative exogenous shock that follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (gBm),
exemplified by :
dX(t) = αX(t)dt+ σX(t)dz (3.2)
In which α corresponds to the drift rate, i.e., the risk neutral rate and σ translates
the instantaneous profit volatility and dz the standard increment of the Weiner Process.
Taking into consideration the value of the company as the total profit flows generated
in the future, if the company is able to support a scenario where the marginal costs
are larger than its peer, R, the value of the company is given the following expression
(Azevedo et al., 2016).
v(X) =
∫ ∞
0
(a− c− δ)2
9b
Xe−(r−α)tdt =
(a− c− δ)2
9b
X
r − α (3.3)
However, the decision of the company to incur in espionage activities alters the future
estimations of S. In the case of a favourable decision to espionage activities, the value
of the enterprise S will be conditional to the success or failure of such activities. Based
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on the risk neutral profile of S, the expected value of the company is given by the future
profit flows, weighted by the state contingent of the spy actions.
V (X) = (1− p)
∫ ∞
0
(a− c− δ)2
9b
Xe−(r−α)tdt+ p
∫ ∞
0
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
Xe−(r−α)tdt
= (1− p)(a− c− δ)
2
9b
X
r − α + p
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
X
r − α (3.4)
Where p is the penetration rate, that determines the success of the Espionage activities.
It also should be noted that the penetration rate, p, drives the probability of success of
such actions. However, the decision of the company to incur in spy actions comes with
a price. The Espionage Cost, will be dependent on the quality or intensity of the spy
actions powered by S.
K(p) =
p
1− pz (3.5)
The Equation (3.5) defines the structure of espionage costs of S, where p corresponds
to the penetration rate and the z will be a scale parameter of these costs. Also, Equation
(3.5) assumes a one shot cost structure, in other words, the company pays a specific
amount in the beginning of the process and it does not have any other financial burden
with the activity. The hiring of the services of detective’s agencies, as it happens in
the Oracle’s espionage attempt to Microsoft’s suppliers and collaborators exemplifies this
assumption4. But, specifically, as we said before, the dependency of the spy costs of its
outcome, i.e., of the level of information that could get from its peer require a specific
behaviour of the costs. Along with the continuous behaviour and the twice differentiable
condition, we assume that cost of espionage will be unbearable when the company tries to
ensure the highest available quality or all process of R, i.e., a penetration rate equal to 1.
In other words, if the company would like to insure the granted success of the espionage
activities, the subsequent cost would be unsupportable. On the other hand, when the
company does not take any kind of information or the p is null , the company will not
support any spy cost. In marginal terms, we also assume that the additional rise of the
cost will be more than proportional to the additional rise of the penetration rate, i.e.,
the marginal cost of the spying will increase more than proportional the probability of
penetration in the company R5. Although, this condition is also indirectly determined in
4https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2011-09-20/famous-cases-of-corporate-espionage
5Whitney and Gaisford (1999) also exemplify this behaviour, stating that the positive behaviour of
the average cost of spying, K(p)−K(0)p always increase with the rise of the penetration rate.
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the continuous behaviour assumed before.
lim
p→1
K(p) = +∞ (3.6)
lim
p→0
K(p) = 0 (3.7)
∂K(p)
∂p
> 0 ,
∂2K(p)
∂p2
> 0 (3.8)
Established the cost of espionage and the expected value of S, conditional to the
success of the espionage activities , it is possible to formalize the investment problem of
the company S, i.e., the company S is facing a decision to incur in espionage activities,
based on its profitability and its costs. In order to solve this problem, we adapt the model
of Huisman and Kort (2015) that takes into consideration the optimal penetration rate
and the optimal trigger to initiate the spy operations.
V (X) = (3.9)
= max
t≥0,0≤p≤1
E
(∫ ∞
t=T
(
(1− p)(a− c− δ)
2
9b
+ p
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
)
Xe−(r−α)t − p
1− pze
−rT |X(0) = X
)
Taking into consideration this decision, T expresses the time horizon that the decision
will be undertaken, while p establishes the penetration rate in the productive system of the
company R. However, the decision of the company is dependent on the total information
available at time 0.
In order to solve this problem, we need to split the solution in two steps. The first
consist in solving the optimum level of penetration rate, based on any level of the state
variable (X). The corresponding p to any X is given by solving:
max
0≤p≤1
E
(∫ ∞
t=0
(
(1− p)(a− c− δ)
2
9b
+ p
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
)
Xe−(r−α)t − p
1− pz|X(0) = X
)
(3.10)
Which gives,
p∗ = 1− 3
2
√
zb(r − α)
Xδ(a− c) (3.11)
Equation (3.11) expresses the optimal penetration rate, based on the costs of
spy actions, for any level of X. The level of optimum level of penetration or the
probability translates the equality between the marginal benefit of increasing the
intensification/penetration rate of the spy attempts of S to R’ activities and the marginal
cost to obtain it.
It is also should be noted that the optimum penetration rate is translate, in numerical
terms, in the equality between the marginal cost of spy activities and the S’s profit
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disparity the two contingent-states of espionage’s results6.
From Equation (3.11), we are able to identify the positive relation between the
penetration rate and the value of the trigger, the cost advantage of company R and
the riskless growth rate. Thus, as the cost’s difference increase or R’s cost improvement
increases, the marginal benefit of the spy actions rise, which boost the intention of the S
to a larger knowledge about the R’s production process. With a larger price able to pay
with the non-existence of supply (a), as well as the better perspectives about the future of
the company, that translates in a larger riskless growth rate, greater will be the intensity
or the quality of the spy attacks of S. Thus, the rise of this parameters will lead to a more
favourable decision in what concerns to the use of espionage actions. In opposition, higher
levels of costs, whether connected to spy actions or to production, higher sensibility of the
costumers to potential drifts in the price, as well as higher interest rate, or opportunity cost
to incur in other alternatives lead to lower levels of optimal penetration rates. Whitney
and Gaisford (1999) addressed the spy cost as an important factor to the occurrence of
such actions, due to the role performed in the efficiency for the company. The low cost
of intelligence operations after the end of Cold War, as weel as the excess of resources
in this area of led to a greater incentive of these activities (which in our model leads to
a larger penetration rate). Therefore, the higher optimal outcome provided by the spy
actions, p∗, is demanded when embodies larger values of X, a, δ, α and lower values of z,
b, r and c7.
Based on the benefits and the costs of espionage activities and its influence in the
value of S, this company will exercise the option to spy considering the indirect and
direct costs. Assuming F (X) as the value of the option to espionage and X? as the
optimal exercising value (trigger), the value of espionage will be given, after investment,
by solving the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
1
2
σ2X2F ′′(X) + αXF ′(X)− rF (X) + (a− c− δ)
2
9b
X = 0 (3.12)
Taking into consideration Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the general solution must take the
form of:
F (X) = AXβ +
(a− c− δ)2
9b
X
r − α (3.13)
In order to choose the optimal investment decision, the company must satisfy the
6Taking into consideration our model and the behaviour of each variable, the penetration rate will be
always positive due to the lower value of the marginal cost of espionage in relation to its benefit when
the penetration rate is null (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999). It is possible to see in the Appendix A
7In this study, we take into assumption that X(0) < X∗, stating that it is not optimal to invest in the
first moment. Only when the company reaches X∗, the company S will invest. In this way, the optimal
investment time equals the first time that the stochastic process X, starting at X(0) at time zero, reaches
the level X∗.
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appropriate boundary conditions, given by the following equations,
lim
X→0
F (X) = 0 (3.14)
lim
X→X∗
F (X) = V (X)−K(z, p) (3.15)
lim
X→X∗
∂F (X)
∂X
=
∂V (X)
∂X
(3.16)
The first condition, named as absorbing barrier condition, establishes that the value
of the company, as the trigger is closing to zero, the value of the option is also worthless.
The second and the third condition, known as value matching condition and smooth
past condition, respectively, explain us that the Value of the option to spy equals the
present value of the future profit flows of S, conditional to the probability of espionage
the company R, net from the implicit costs of this action when the trigger is closing from
the optimum value. Although, the proximity will be smooth, i.e., the metamorphosis of
the value of the option to the net present value of the profit flows happen continuously.
This situation is mathematically interpreted by the equality between both value functions
derivatives. Remitting for espionage environment, Equation (3.15) elucidates that the net
benefit of the spy actions n the total amount of the future profit flows of S will be equal
to the value S in a unfavourable situation with an option to incur in such activities, at
the X∗. However, as we said before, this equality results from a process of approximation
of the value of both states, as it is stated in Equation (3.16).
X∗ denotes the optimal moment to incur in espionage, This optimum value of Equation
(3.2) shows us that the S is indifferent at this point between investing or not in the spy
actions. The corresponding optimal penetration rate is given by p∗(X∗). To levels of X
higher than X∗, the company is facing the stopping region, where it is optimum to invest
immediately. In opposite situation, the scenario where the value of X is lower to X∗, the
profit is still too low to sustain the espionage actions. Therefore, the company should wait
to invest, being present in the continuation region (Huisman and Kort, 2015). Taking into
consideration the Equation (3.12), Equation (3.14), Equation (3.15), Equation (3.16) , we
are able to solve the second step of the problem, the value of X∗. The value of the S,
taking into consideration the vlaue of the option to invest in espionage operations is given
by:
F (X) =

AXβ +
(a− c− δ)2
9b
X
r − α if X < X
∗
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
X
r − α + z −
2
3
√
Xzδ
b(r − α)(
√
a− c−√c− 1) if X ≥ X∗
(3.17)
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Where,
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r
σ2
(3.18)
A = z
(
4
9
)2(
bz(r − α)β2
δ(a− c)(β − 1)2
)−β
(β − 1)2 (3.19)
To those parameters, the value of the optimal trigger X∗ and the specific p∗(X∗) is
equivalent to:
X∗ =
9bz(r − α)
4δ(a− c)
β2
(β − 1)2 (3.20)
p∗(X∗) =
1
β
(3.21)
It is possible to identify the resemblances between the optimal penetration rate at
optimal trigger and the optimal output value of our model, given by Equation (3.20) and
Equation (3.21), with the similar parameters on the study of Huisman and Kort (2015). In
Equation (3.20), it is also useful to identify two parts of the general component, 9bz(r−α)
4δ(a−c) ,
and a risk factor, β
2
(β−1)2 .
Considering that ∂β
∂σ
< 0, ∂β
∂α
< 0 and ∂β
∂r
> 0, we develop a sensitivity analysis
in order to understand the marginal effect of different parameters (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). Based on the value of X∗ and p∗(X∗), we assume that:
∂X∗
∂β
= −9bz(r − α)
2δ(a− c)
β
(β − 1)2 < 0 (3.22)
∂p∗(X∗)
∂β
= − 1
β2
< 0 (3.23)
Through the previous results, and as it is announced in the Real Options Approach,
the rise in the uncertainty, σ, results in a larger penetration rate as well as a larger
optimal moment. In other words, the higher uncertainty surrounding the market of both
companies implies that the firm invest later but for a larger penetration rate. Also, the
larger volatility will also be granted a higher intesity of spy actions of S in R, as it happens
in Huisman and Kort (2015) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), i.e., the company opts to a
larger certainty in the espionage output in times of higher risk, as well as a larger amount
of information.
Thus, the large level of uncertainty that is installed in the market can define some
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concepts of the industry. One of these is the expectations of S. With a increase of the
uncertainty in the market, S might search a larger amount of depth of the information
provided by the spy actions, which is translated with a larger p∗.
Also, the rivalry between companies can be theoretically analysed. Whitney and
Gaisford (1999) affirmed that espionage is influenced, in practical terms, for the struggle
between the enterprises in the industry. However, in theoretical terms, the greater conflict
between companies or strategic quarrels might be synonym of the larger risk or uncertainty
in the future, once that S has a higher chance of being a target of harmful situations.
In this way, the rise of the conflict between S and R might induce in a larger volatility,
σ, which might bring a higher disposition of S to obtain a higher amount of information
through espionage operations. But, this larger certainty or intensity will be postponed in
relation to the optimal timing.
The rise of uncertainty that leads to a larger p∗(X∗) also highlights the boost of the
cost of espionage. Methodologically, the cost structure of our model justify this relation.
According with economic intuition, the rise of p∗(X∗) and consequent rise of K can
elucidates the quality improvement of the instruments used or even the higher demand
for the means used in the spy attempts8.
Empirically, it can be shown this effect once industries where the risk and the
uncertainty surrounding the structure changes in the future are more vulnerable to
potential successful spy attempts of its competitors. The high-tech industry is a real
example of this situation, where potential innovations in the future change the market’s
structure and the peers that cannot have a R&D so developed opted for spy actions.
As we see before, the uncertainty also positively conditionates the optimal timing to
incur in espionage. We can stablish two of opposite effects when S tries to incur in spy
actions. The company can be interested in spying R quickly, in order to decrease the time
horizon that will be in disadvantage in relation to R, and also more vulnerable to potential
threats that jeopardize its position. Although, the swift spy attempt comes with a lower
level of quality or intensity (the lower X∗ decreases p∗(X∗)). By the other hand, S can opt
for different strategy, i.e., S can wait more time to spy R and bear out a longer period in
disadvantage and invest in a larger attack (a larger X∗ implies a greater p∗(X∗)). Based
on larger levels of uncertainty, S becomes more reluctant to the first strategy and tolerates
a higher financial pressure (due to the a longer period in disadvantage), but when incur
in spy actions, the level obtained of information or the intensity of spy operations will be
higher.
8It is possible to identify this two effects separately. A larger intensity or quality inlay a greater
p∗(X∗), but considering that it is not possible to higher quality, the company can opt for a larger amount
of tools, which in both circumstances, increase the level of information obtained and also the cost of these
operations.
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The optimal timing to incur in spy activities is also influenced by the cost structure
of S. As the cost increase, either c or z, the optimal time to start the espionage activities
is postponed, which translates a greater reluctance to incur in spy activities or own a
superior level of expected profits to bear the costs of this operations. This inference can
justify the relative cost of innovation, i.e., when the cost of espionage is too high, it loses
the cost’s advantage comparing to innovation, which leads the company to incur in, e.g.,
R&D activities.
Related with the costs, the cost advantage also deserves attention. The inverse relation
between the trigger and the parameter, δ, shows that, as long as the disparity between
the costs of both companies is significant larger, S should invest in spying activities in a
shorter period of time, in order to sustain its activity. It can also be considered indirect
effects of the significant discrepancy among companies. As it the model’s conception is
based on Cournot Duopoly Game, the larger difference in the costs determines a lower
market’s share for S, due to the larger production cost that company charges. This higher
cost, comparing with the R, decrease the consumer’s sentiment to change if any external
act occur. In this way, S hastens the spy actions against R.
However, the model shows an effect in the time that company decides to incur in
espionage activities, but it does not do any reference to the optimal penetration rate.
The non-inclusion of any consequence of the company conditional to the result of the spy
attempts of S might explain this effect, i.e., whichever the result of the spy actions or
the level of information withdrawn by R, S will not be condemned for its practices. This
non-responsibility of S for its actions leads to a concentration of the enterprise’s decision
in the moment which incur in such actions, which leads to a direct influence of all factors
in X∗. In this way, the level of information obtained for R, p∗(X∗), only depends the
market’s environment and the macroeconomic conditions. In this way, no matter what
it will result, when the company decides to incur in spy actions,S has no problem of
accepting the consequences of espionage attempts.
∂X∗
∂z
=
9b(r − α)β2
4δ(a− c)β2 > 0 (3.24)
∂X∗
∂c
=
9bz(r − α)β2
4δ(a− c)2β > 0 (3.25)
∂X∗
∂δ
= −9bz(r − α)β
2
4δ2(a− c)β2 < 0 (3.26)
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3.3 Numerical Example
The company S and R share a specific market, where R has a significant cost advantage
comparing to S, 10%. In order to know how R possesses a lower marginal production
cost, S is considering to incur into espionage operations. The successful attempt implies
a reduction of the production costs to S because it embeds R’s production processes into
S’s production. However, such activities have a cost, that, in terms of scale, are equal
to the marginal cost of production. Also, the demand in this specific market is not very
sensitive to price shifts. It also should be noted that the company wants to reduce the
losses that this cost advantage is bringing to them and balance the market with R. The
value of the different parameters is present in the following table:
Parameters Value
a 10
b 2
r 0.04
α 0.02
σ 0.3
c 6
δ 0.6
z 6
Table 3.3: Numerical Assumptions of the Different Parameters
Based on the previous model equations, we are able to identify the Optimal Trigger
and the Optimal Penetration Rate:
Output Value
X∗ 5.26309
p∗(X∗) 0.79323
Table 3.4: Output Values for the parameters present in Table 3.3
Taking into consideration Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the decision of making espionage
actions will be optimally when the X∗ is equal to 5.26309. Based on the analysis of the
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boundary conditions, presented in Equation (3.14), Equation (3.15) and Equation (3.16),
the indifference moment for the company to decide if will incur in espionage activities
happen when the optimal trigger reaches 5.26309. Below that, S is willing to bear out
the market unfavourable position against R. Above, the company immediately opts for
such actions to embed the productions costs of R in their productive product. However,
this interpretation is only true if we connect this value with the optimal penetration rate.
In this case, based on the parameters of volatility, risk free rate and growth rate, it is
possible to realize that the company can successfully capture with a p equal to 79.323%,
which possibilities a value of the company estimated in 280.334 monetary units, with a
spy cost of 23.0189 monetary units. It is possible also to highlight the larger penetration
rate implied in this optimal spy actions, with a larger level of spy intensity implied.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of the Optimum Trigger according to potential shifts of cost
advantage, δ
As we said before, the rise in the cost’s discrepancy among companies anticipates the
decision of S to incur in espionage activities. An cost advantage of 70% for company R,
as it is described in Figure 3.2 with a δ of 4.2, demonstrate a lower level of the profits for
S. The same situation does not happen for an advantage of 10% (δ equals to 0.6), that
demand a significant amount of profits to sustain the espionage activities. As we see in the
analytical analysis, the optimal timing to spy are positive influenced by the operational
costs, as well as the costs of espionage. It is possible to see the relation in Figure 3.3 and
3.4. In both figures, it is possible to see that as c and z increase, the optimal time to
incur in espionage is delayed. However, the influence of costs of espionage is larger when
we consider low levels of production and spy costs, and the opposite relation is observed
to greater levels of costs.
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the Optimum Trigger according to potential shifts of Production
Costs, c
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of the Optimum Trigger according to potential shifts of costs of
espionage, z
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Chapter 4
Society’s Decision to Spy
”The object of the Government
is the Welfare of the people”
Theodore Roosevelt, 1858-1919
4.1 Introduction of the Regulator’s Role
In the last section, we designed an efficient model that establishes the optimal time to
spy by the company S in its rival, R, that possesses a cost advantage due to a favourable
organization or even a technological advance that S knows ex ante. In spite of such
decision being efficient to the company, it is possible that the general society is better
off with the occurrence of the spy actions? Is it possible that the these profits flow
transference to the company R induces a better aggregate position to the costumers and
to the producers?
This economic welfare for the consumers and producers presented in the market
is fully maximized in a competitive environment, as it is characterized by the perfect
market competition (Fisher, 2007). The incentives provided to innovate and decrease
the production and distribution costs to the possible lowest price guarantee the equality
between the marginal social benefits and costs (Fisher, 2007). However, the scope of
the normal profits under important identified circumstances are not possible to achieve
(Fisher, 2007). The non-reflection of the marginal social costs in the marginal production
costs, the significant disparity between the individual and the social marginal benefits, as
well as the lack of competition and the absence of externalities might contributes to the
society’s conditions degradation. In the present model, the best interest of the society
might have been set aside once the entry barriers and the presence of only two companies
in the market does not accommodate a high level of competition. The non-existence of
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significant externalities also support the non-perfect environment.
Thus, when the competitive choices does not match the society’s best interests or
the market’s efficiency, the regulator should improve the performance of the industry
(Fisher, 2007). This regulator, that might be acted by the Government, ensures the
efficient use of the resources and the maximization of the social welfare. In this way,
the government should promote the best costumers’ and producers’ satisfaction, i.e.,
the resource’s allocation that ensures the largest social welfare, that could not improve
without the deterioration of someone. The mitigation of the distribution inequality and
the macroeconomic stabilization are also a priority (Musgrave, 1959).
When the decision of the government is preferable in relation to the singular decision
of the agents presented in the market, the consequences in the welfare of any decision are
the primary objective to determine the investment size and timing (Huisman and Kort,
2015; Fisher, 2007). The welfare of the society constitutes the net gain for the suppliers
and consumers of producing a specific amount of output. This concept can be captured
in a specific market by the total or social surplus, W (X), that represent the sum of the
consumer surplus, CS(X), and the producer surplus, PS(X), (Cullis et al., 2009).
In respect to consumer’s role in the market, it is priority of the Government to improve
the consumer surplus in the market until the largest level of efficiency. The following
Equation presents the instantaneous value of the consumer surplus.
CS =
∫ a
P (QR,QS)
a
b
− P
b
dP =
1
2
b(QR +QS) (4.1)
According to Marshall (1920), one of the first to study the role of the government in
the market’s efficiency, establishes that consumers surplus comprehends the discrepancy
between the price that a consumer is able to pay and the price that actually paid. This
difference between the marginal benefits of the consumers and the market’s price paid,
conditional to a fixed level of income, positive evaluates with the lower cost structure of
R and S.
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Addition on CS With a Industrail Marginal Cost of c-δ
Addition on CS With a Fall in R's Marginal Cost for c-δ
CS with a Industrial Marginal Cost of c
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of Consumer Surplus based on the assumptions of section 3.3,
according with the Swifts in the Marginal Costs of R and S
The improvement in the efficiency of the production of company R, that led to the
margin production cost of δ , allowed that a marginal rise of the consumer surplus of
δ(4a−4c+δ)
18b
1. The enhance of the disparity between the marginal benefits for the consumer
and the actual cost they paid for a unit of output is result from the interaction of both
companies in the market that allows a larger produced output and a lower price (Fisher,
2007).
The enhancement of the consumers welfare is even greater when S successfully spy R.
In this state, the surplus measured by what consumers is able to pay and what actually
pays rises
δ(2a−2c+ 3
2
δ)
9b
from the state where S presents larger production costs. From a
initial situation, where both present a marginal cost of c, the consumers surplus registered
an improvement of δ(4a−4c+2δ)
9b
.
As previously, the rise in the welfare of the consumers is only possible from a
reduction of the marginal production cost, that consequently (through a Cournot Duopoly
interaction), allow a rise in the output created by both companies and a lower market
price. As it is present in Table 3.2, the success of espionage operations for S enhances
the industry’s output in δ
3b
and decreases the market price from a+2c−δ
3
to a+2c−2δ
3
. In
theoretical terms, the welfare of the consumers improves via two major effects, the income
effect and the substitution effect (Cullis et al., 2009). The income effect shows that
1For deeper analysis, see section B
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espionage activities enable consumers to pay a lower price which rises the real income
that clients detains. On other hand, the lower price guarantees a substitution of the
consumer, in deterioration to those with larger prices, that translates in the substitution
effect.
The welfare of the consumer is influenced by the success or failure of espionage
operations and Equation 4.1 needs to capture this effect. As it happens in Equation
(3.4), the CS demonstrates the expected outcome of spy actions in the disparity between
the benefits and the actual cost for the consumers. In this approach, as it happen before,
the multiplicate shock will affect the instantaneous consumer surplus in the market.
CS(X) = E
(
p
∫ ∞
t=0
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
Xe−(r−α)tdt+ (1− p)
∫ ∞
t=0
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
18b
Xe−(r−α)tdt|X(0) = X
)
=
X
r − α
(
(1− p)(2a− 2c+ δ)
2
18b
+ p
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
)
(4.2)
The social welfare also integrate the other side of the market, the producers. The
difference between the price charged by the market for the created output and the marginal
cost of its production conceptualize the producers surplus (Fisher, 2007). As it happen
in Huisman and Kort (2015), the value of the welfare of the suppliers equalizes the total
amount of future profit flows, i.e.,the expected value of R and S.
Thus, the gap between the price that producers received and the minimum amount that
they require to produce is conditional to the espionage outcome of the activities performed
by S in the value of both companies, as it happen in the value of the consumer surplus
(Cullis et al., 2009)2. The value of both companies, as it happen in the last chapter for
S, are affected by the multiplicative industrial shock that follows the movement described
in Equation (3.2).
PS(X) =
E
(∫ ∞
t=T
(
(1− p)
(
(a− c− δ)2 + (a− c+ 2δ)2)
9b
)
+ p
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
)
Xe−(r−α)t − p
1− pze
−rT |X(0) = X
)
=
X
r − α
(
p
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
+ (1− p)
(
(a− c− δ)2 + (a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
))
(4.3)
The bottom gain for the society of the market’s dynamic that translates in the
production of the optimal quantity can be represented by the sum of both excesses,
consumer and producer surplus. In this way, the social welfare, W (X), translates the
difference between the marginal benefits and the costs added by an extra unit of output
2The value of S is previously calculated in Equation (3.4). However, the value of R is presented on
the Appendix A, for further detail.
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for the society for all the opportunities in the market (Fisher, 2007).
W (X) = CS(X) + PS(X)
=
X
r − α
(
p
(
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
+
2(a− c− δ)2
9b
)
+ (1− p)
(
(a− c− δ)2
9b
+
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
+
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
18b
))
(4.4)
4.2 Optimal Society’s Spy Equilibrium
The individual decision of S in relation to the occurrence of spy actions with the aim of
embed the competitive cost advantage of R in the intern production takes into account
the efficiency according to the cost structure of the company. Based on this decision, the
optimal timing and the penetration rate that equalizes the marginal benefit and cost for
the company S, as it is present in Equation (3.21) and Equation (3.20), translates into a
gain for the society of:
W (X∗, p∗) =
zb(8β(a− c)2 + 8δ(a− c)(1 + β) + δ2(11δ − 3))
8δ(a− c)(β − 1)2 (4.5)
Although, as we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the non-existence of
substantial competition in the market, that provides conditions to S reduce the unitary
cost of production of production, via economies of scale, and the existence of entry
barriers that jeopardize the reach of the equilibrium between marginal benefit and cost,
rises the gap between the fulfilment of the social interests and the efficiency of R and S
(Fisher, 2007). Combining these factors with the absence of externalities in the company’s
decision, the behaviour of other agents, as consumers and peers, lift the importance of
the Government’s intervention in the market, as social planner or regulator. With the
aim of maximizing the social welfare of the market, the government decides to approve or
not to condemn the espionage operations of S under the methodological conditions that
based S’s efficient decision on the previous chapter. Therefore, The social optimal timing
to incur in espionage actions and the optimal intensity of such actions is given by3
X∗∗ =
18bz(r − α)
δ(8a− 8c− 3δ)
β2
(β − 1)2 (4.6)
p∗∗(X∗∗) = p∗(X∗) =
1
β
(4.7)
Based on the studies of Huisman and Kort (2015) and Equation (4.6) and Equation
3For detailed analysis of the calculation of the social optimal timing and penetration rate, see section B
32
The Option to Spy: The Firm behaviour, Global Welfare and Policy Measures
(4.7), the comparision between the efficient social solutions demonstrate a bias, i.e., the
social optimal value of the penetration rate equalizes the efficient solution, Equation
(3.21), which does not happen comparing with the related value in Huisman and Kort
(2015). On the other hand, the social optimal timing to incur in espioange activities
is larger than what is founded in Equation (3.20) on the S’s efficient decision, contrary
the equivalence proposed by Huisman and Kort (2015). Therefore, the government, in
order to protect the best interests of the society, should defend an similar intensity of the
espionage operations but later. For the regulator, it is only acceptable the activities of
espionage with a larger postponement because the social optimal trigger is almost two
times larger than the efficient optimal trigger for S.
With respect with the optimal timing for the government condemn the espionage
decision of S, the social planner states a large timing to accept these actions, only
achievable by mature or more developed industries. In this way, it is possible to perceive
that the government decision is dependent on the life cycle phase of the company,
accepting such actions when the company reaches a significant level of maturity or stability
and reprimand them when the enterprise decides to spy in a earlier stage of the business
cycle, either in the beginning of its activities or either in a later stage when firm is still
small, but with a larger set of opportunities to grow.
Also, through the timing in which is socially optimal to espionage, it is apparent
or pertinent the government protection of the production and innovation activities of
small-size companies , or even start-up projects, due to the larger set of cash flows that is
required to accept spy operations.
The acceptance of spy actions for developed industries or more mature can be
theoretically justified by the break of the industrial status quo, i.e.,the espionage activities
is seen as an incentive to the companies presented in the market to improve its production
methods, or even expand to other areas. In other words, the acceptance of such actions
might lead companies to improve constantly its methods because firms have the knowledge
that cash flows stability might be compromised by espionage.
Comparing the optimal timing in firm’s and society’s decision, presented in Equation
(3.20) and Equation (4.6), it is possible to conclude the equal effect of all parameters
concerned with the preferences or marginal benefits of the consumers (a and b), the
industry production and operation’s Costs (c ,δ and z) and the uncertainty or vulnerability
of the market (σ). It should be noted that the cost advantage, δ, present a more complex
effect, with a higher influence on the timing with two opposite forces. Although in
aggregate terms, the cost advantage holds the same effect as before.
The disparity between the optimal timing to incur in espionage for S and for the society
shows a different approach to study the implications of spy activities in the society and in
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the economic performance. According to the section 2.4, the role or the effect of espionage
does not generate consensus in the literature, existing authors like ,Whitney and Gaisford
(1999), Cozzi (2001) and Solan and Yariv (2004) that evidence the benefits of espionage,
in what concerns to a swift technological diffusion in the society, higher level of efficiency
due to the lower cost of Information and better economic conditions provided by the
transference of cost’s advantage.
In opposition, Crane (2005), Sarangi et al. (2010) and ? demonstrated that espionage
activities might bring harmful repercussions to the society. The deterioration of the
commercial interest to the population, the long-term injuries caused by the quick growth
of this activity and the non-repercussion in welfare improvements for this activities are
some reasons that justify this ”dark side of the espionage activities”.
Chen (2016) also highlighted the ambiguous effect of espionage in the society, that
depends on two antagonistic forces, the technological transfer and the cost reduction
investment.
Particularly, according to this study, the implications of espionage in the society
highlight the timing in which they happen, i.e., the timing of these actions decides if the
spy actions will benefit the Society or does not meet the social interests. This bilateral
nature shows that espionage activities happen before the optimal timing for the society
(Equation (4.6)), the repercussions of such activities decrease the welfare of the society.
Contrarily, if spy attempts begin after or in the optimal timing, the welfare of producers
and consumers are safeguarded. In this way, the role of corporate espionage in the economy
does not assure a stable effect, which might obligate the government and the regulator to
be monitor the market’s structure or conditions. Thus, government should work side by
side with players of the market to promote the competition, the enhance of the market’s
performance and the social welfare (Fisher, 2007).
With the equivalence of the firm’s and society’s decision for the optimal intensity
or quality of espionage actions, powered by S, this critical value achieve even more
comprehensive concept. Besides of translating the equality between the extra benefit
and cost of a potential unit rise of spy actions for S, it also adds the similar state for
the society. In other words, the same solution match the social marginal benefit with the
social cost. According to Fisher (2007), when the market or the economy can reach this
equivalence, it achieves the full-efficiency, once there is no incentive to switch the state of
the market.
The efficiency stated by the social equilibrium enables the exhaustion of all the
aggregate gains of espionage activities for the society, as well as a production to the lowest
possible unitary cost (Fisher, 2007). Therefore, the optimal timing and the equilibrium
penetration rate for the society granted a social welfare equal to:
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W (X∗∗, p∗∗) =
zβ(8(a− c)2 + 8δ(a− c)(β + 1) + δ2(11β − 3))
(8a− 8c− 3δ)(β − 1)2 (4.8)
As we stated before, the firm’s decision to incur in espionage earlier than it is optimal
to the society compromises the aggregate benefits of the market of such action. It is
possible to see this effect on the value of social surplus with the optimal equilibrium of
S’s decision, provided by Equation (4.8) and for the government decision. If S decided
to invest sooner in spy actions against R, as it is stated by the efficient optimal trigger,
the value of the social welfare will be lower than it is expectable with the social optimal
time. In this way, is incurs in a loss for the society. Based on the difference of the welfare
of both states, we are able to estimate the loss of welfare provided by the gap between
both decisions.
∆W = W (X∗, p∗)−W (X∗∗, p∗∗)
= −3(8zβ
2(a− c)2 + 8δ(a− c)(β + 1) + δ2(11β − 3))
8(a− c)(8a− 8c− 3δ)(β − 1)2 > 0 (4.9)
As we can see in Equation (4.9), the difference in the social welfare between both
equilibrium is negative, which translates the improvement for the society caused by
the decision of the government. Thus, it demonstrates the priority for the regulator to
postpone the occurrence of espionage activities by S in relation to the efficient solution,
for the security of social interests. In other words, the government should promote larger
efficiency in the market through the junction of the optimal timing of S’s and society’s
decision to incur in spy actions.
Theoretically, the government might promote the efficiency in the market through the
market’s nationalization, the creation of a wide range of incentives or also through the
active regulation of market’s economic activity of the companies (Cullis et al., 2009). The
nationalization of the markets imply a direct provision of the products or services by the
state, as it happen in the majority of the public goods. The set of incentives constituted
the primordial method of public intervention based in the imposition of taxes and subsidies
that guarantee a substantial change in the marginal benefits acquired by the producers
and consumers. The legislation concerned with the financial markets, the health-care
activities and education are crucial examples that demonstrate the intervention of the
government via state regulation of the market.
Methodologically, the social planner must create ”public vehicles” that delay the
optimal decision of the company, or anticipate the social timing of incurring in espionage.
With this objective, we will introduce two different public means that guarantee the
parallel satisfaction of the social and S’s interests. The counter espionage financed by the
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state and the introduction of the consumer subsidy allow the backwardness of the firm’s
decision until the optimal timing for the society.
4.3 Possible Actions of the Policy Maker
4.3.1 Defence Tactics
In aggregate terms, the success of espionage activities translates a improvement in the
economic and financial conditions of S and in the consumers. However, the occurrence of
such activities harms the situation of R, since the profit flow generated by the company
decreases abruptly, and consequently, the future projections of the value of the company
also falls (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999). As this larger level of efficiency of S and consumer
surplus might not respect the social interests, the regulator may intervene in the market
in order to re-establish the R’s advantage and delay the entry of espionage activities in
the activity of S.
In order to protect the activity of R, that, in aggregate terms, delays the success of
the espionage activities and promote the retardation of the efficient optimal timing of S,
the government promotes the use of defence techniques of company R.
The possibility of R counter-espionage or defend its cost’s advantage is recurrent in
practice. The Google’s announcement affirming that the company was victim of a cyber
attack, located in China, that failed in the attempt of stop the theft of immaterial assets
shows the the existence of firm’s defence instruments4.
However, the public assistance might be very difficult to observe, and it is more
recurrent the focus on the attack, i.e., the financing of espionage activities. In order
to embed the defence tactics, q will translate the interception rate, i.e., the level of
success granted by the defence techniques implemented by R. The interception rate also
can translate the probability of company R intercept the spy actions of S. A vigilance
system in the company may be an example of an instrument to promote the safety of the
enterprise’s facilities, and achieve a specific level of q.
As it happen in the penetration rate, the interception rate given by a specific or a set
of defence instruments will reach unbearable costs if the enterprise or the regulator desire
to achieve a full level of interception, a q equal to 100%. In other words, a probability
of being able of fully protect the assets of R will translate an effective cost extravagant
to the government. In line with p, the marginal rise of the interception level of espionage
activities for the spied will lead to a more than proportional rise of defence costs.
The conditions above elucidates the decision’s problem of R and government to choose
4https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2011-09-20/famous-cases-of-corporate-espionage
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an appropriate set of security instruments that give a specific level of q, lower than 1 and
larger than 0.
The dynamics behind the existence of defence and attacking techniques in the conflict
between R and S also deserves some attention. In what concerns to the success of both
activites, it is assumed in the model, according with the empirical evidence that, the
interception rate absorbs the effect of penetration level. In other words, of the defence
company is able to intercept espionage activities, it is impossible for S to scape or continue
to spy R.
But what justifies R being willing to do such activities? Such as the company S is
able to identify that is in disadvantage comparing to its competitor, R is also able to
see that detains an advantage against S that improve its condition. Due to the available
information in the market and the different levels of profits that each cost structure in the
market is able to provide, R is willing to protect its advantage, and in order to do that,
it incur in defence activities because they knew that it exists the possibility of company
S spies.
The embodiment of defence activities in the model generates four possible outcomes,
provided by combinations of defence activities of R and spying activities of S, as it it
demonstrated in Table 4.1.
R does nor defend R defends
1− p p
S does not spy
(1− p)(1− q) (1− p)q
1− p
S spies
p(1− q) pq
p
Table 4.1: Espionage and Counter Espionage States and Outcomes
In spite of the decisions of R and S to incur in specific activities generate four different
outcomes, it is only possible to observe two different states. This restriction of the set
of identified states with possible repercussions for the value of the Industry and for the
welfare of society is result from the absorption effect of intercept activities of R to the
spy actions. As the espionage will not succeed if R also decide in defence operations, the
success of S’s activities only happen when the defence techniques are not available. Thus,
the success of the of espionage activities is not only dependent on the quality of the spy
instruments, but also is related with the failure of defence techniques.
p(1− q) (4.10)
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On the other hand, the failure in the collection of Rs cost advantage by S’s espionage
actions is result from the spy operations’ flop, i.e., the methods or techniques used for
spying did not meet the identification of R’s advantage, even when the defence techniques
were not used, or even the outcomes that highlight the existence of counter-espionage
methods, independent of the S’ decision to incur in espionage. Thus, the success on the
maintenance of cost advantage in R’s production method is given by the sum of three
distinct outcomes, as it is presented in Equation (4.11).
(1− p)(1− q) + (1− p)q + pq = 1− p(1− q) (4.11)
Therefore, the success on the acquisition of R’s efficient vantage of production and
their joining in the productive process of S no longer depend only in the positive outcome
of spy actions, but also in the lack of success of counter espionage actions of R. This
new factor to take into consideration by S will impact the proportion of each state in the
value of this company, once it depends on the level of penetration rate, p, but also on the
interception rate, q.
Vq = max
T≥0,0≤p≤1
(4.12)
E
(∫ ∞
t=0
(
(1− p(1− q))(a− c− δ)
2
9b
+ p(1− q)(a− c+ δ)
2
9b
)
Xe−(r−α)t − p
1− pz|X(0) = X
)
As it is possible to see in Equation (4.13), the value of S considers the value of
profit flows generated by the existence or not of a gap in the cost’s structure of both
companies taking into account the state generated by the dynamics of espionage and
counter espionage activities by R and S. This dynamics, combined with the Real Options
Approach, modulate the introduction of defense tactics in the optimal efficient solution for
the Timing in the Occurrence of Espionage and in the Optimal intensity of such actions.
Based on the same process as before, as it is also mentioned in the Appendix B, the
decision of S is based in a optimal timing and a optimal intensity of soy actions of:
X∗q =
9bz(r − α)
4δ(a− c)(1− q)
β2
(β − 1)2 (4.13)
p∗q(X
∗) = p∗∗(X∗∗) = p∗(X∗) =
1
β
(4.14)
As it is possible to see, comparing Equation (4.13) with Equation (3.20), relation
with the common parameters remains the same, being the effect equal. However, the
introduction of q brings a new effect or factor that shifts the optimal timing to incur
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in espionage. The rise of defence tactics by R delays the entry of spy actions in the
interaction between both companies. Interestingly, the presence of this activities does not
change the optimal quality or intensity of spy activities, as it also does not happen in the
social approach on chapter 4.
The role of the government is introduced here. As the Government covers all the cost
related with the defence activities of R, it does not exists any change in the social welfare,
only in the efficient solution. In this way, the regulator intervene with the aim of delaying
the positive decision of incurring in spy action until it is beneficial for the society. In order
to do it, the state will finance the necessary amount of defence techniques that guarantee
an specific level of interception rate able to equalize the optimal timing for S and the
social timing to incur in such actions, i.e., X∗q = X
∗∗.
q∗ =
3δ
8(a− c) (4.15)
The timing equivalence of both decisions allow a positive level of interception for the
defence measures of R, but only dependent on the parameters related with the cost’s
structures and with the maximum disposition to pay by the consumers. A positive
increment in any parameter related with the costs of both structures, c and δ, will boost
the optimal level of interception, i.e, the higher the advantage cost of R, higher will be the
predisposition of R and the government to defence its secret or higher will be the means
used to do it. On the other hand, an increase in the marginal cost of the industry will
also rise the defence barriers of R. However, an improvement in the demand’s condition
to pay a higher price, i.e., the consumer are able to pay a higher price when the supply is
insufficient, leads to a negative shift in the optimal level of counter-espionage activities.
4.3.2 Consumption Subsidy
In the last section, we present a possible government intervention in the market via
producers, promoting the defence of R’s cost advantage. Based on the maximization
of social welfare, the regulator might be more interest with a intervention on the side
of consumers. This kind of intervention only produce indirect effect on the competition
of both companies in the market and in the level of competition, with the subsidization
of the products of a specific company. The green subsidies of the different government
budgets in the world are a example of this situation, as it is the subsidization of solar
panels in Portugal until 2009, the public assistance in the acquisition of electric cars in
California and Thailand5.
As the regulator wishes to delay the entry of espionage activities in the decision of
5http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-ev-state-subsidies-20170720-story.html
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S, the government intercedes in favour of promoting the market’s demand, and boosting
the total amount demanded by the consumers, which mitigate the risk supported by S.
With this higher level demanded in the market, the produced output of S increase, which
guarantees a larger profit flow for the company, which may favour the application of funds
in R&D and postpone the spy solution.
Public subsidization, in general terms, is a major mechanism used by the government
in order to promote incentives in different markets (Schwartz and Clements, 1999).
Although, the massive use of these instruments, either in producers or consumers, might
produce substantial opportunity costs for the regulator and other agents in the market.
The concept of subsidy or incentive powered by the government defines the public
assistance on the two sides of the market, by providing better conditions in the market for
the consumers through lower purchase of products and services with a lower price than
it was verified in the competitive private market, or by the raise of producers’ welfare to
values that is not possible without public intervention (Schwartz and Clements, 1999).
This incentives might by compose by explicit or implicit elements.
Based on the definition, subsidizing the consumers preferences compasses any
intervention of the State that distort the full cost of the production of such goods or
services by the producers R and S. Based on the subsidy categorization provided by
Schwartz and Clements (1999), the distortion of the costs and subsequent reduction of
the price for the consumers is only possible with direct government payments to consumers
(cash subsidies or cash grants) or by regulatory subsidies, that consist in implicit payments
based on the regulator’s actions that alter the markets price or the access of information.
But why subsidize? Why the government might be interest in such intervention?
Economically, the public intervention promotes the efficiency and the economic justice in
the dynamic context of the market (Schwartz and Clements, 1999). This assistance is
accomplished by the reallocation of resources that shift the preferences of the consumers
and its behaviour, as well as the level of production of enterprise. The counterbalance of
market imperfections, the promotion of economies of scale and the reach of social policy
objectives (protections of of the most deprived, income’s distributions and higher level
of employment)are the three major reasons of public assistance (Schwartz and Clements,
1999).
The demand’s subsidization by the government changes the preferences and the choices
of consumers, which is crucial in order to achieve a better solution for the society.
With the aim to analyse the impact of consumer’s subsidization, the demand function,
previously indicated in Equation (3.1) needs to incorporate the government intervention.
This intervention is materialized through the parameter t, that mensurates the relative
amount that subsidy covers in relation to the market’s price, P . In other words, t
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translates the percentage of the market’s price that is subsidized. A larger value of
this parameter indicates a higher intervention of the state in this industry. The extreme
case of full subsidization6, it might indicate the entire subsidization of this activity or also
the government production of such services. The Equation (4.16) presents the demand
preferences of the market’s consumers, as well as the intervention of the government.
Pt =
a− b(QS +QR)
1− t (4.16)
According to Equation (4.16), the preferences of the consumer is now dependent of
another factor, the level of government assistance in the market t. The rise of the public
intervention might lead to a higher willing to support larger market prices. Although, the
direct participation of the Regulator in the market also alters the profitability of both
companies, even when is is not yet decided the use of spy actions.
Unsuccessful
Spy Action
Success Spy
Action
Espionage
Impact
Occurrence’s Probability 1− p p
Output Produced by S a−(1−t)(c+δ)
3b a−(1−t)(c−δ)
3b
+2δ(1−t)
3b
Output Produced by R a−(1−t)(c−δ)
3b
− δ(1−t)
3b
Market Price a+(1−t)(2c−δ)
3
a+2(c−δ)(1−t)
3
−δ(1−t)
3
Table 4.2: State Contingent Cournot-Nash Duopoly Outcomes for each state of Espionage
Activities’ results with Public Assistance
As it is possible to see, the intervention of the State brings the same effect of the
spy decision, but diluted with a new agent that is able to boost the performance of the
market. With a larger intervention of the Government, which is translated in this case in
a larger t, the market price decrease to the consumers, which lead to a larger willingness
to buy this products.
But, even with a subsidization of the activity of both companies, what should be the
decision of S in relation to the occurrence of spy activities? The timing and the optimal
level of penetrating in R is, in these circumstances, vulnerable to the higher-efficient
level of the production of R, but also the level of Public presence. Based in the same
methodology that was present before, the optimal timing to incur in Espionage Activities
6t equals 100% of the price.
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by S and the optimal level in a context of market’s subsidization is given by7
X∗t =
9bz(r − α)
δ(a(4− t) + t(5ct− c+ 3δ(1− t))− 4c)
β2
(β − 1)2 (4.17)
p∗t (X
∗) = p∗q(X
∗) = p∗∗(X∗∗) = p∗(X∗) =
1
β
(4.18)
Based on the Equation (4.18), it is possible to identify resemblances with the Efficient
Solution of S in Equation (3.20), but with a complex effect of the Public Intervention,
t. This does not yield a singular effect on the Value of the Optimal Timing to incur
in Espionage, as we will analyse further. Once again, the Presence of the Government
in the Market does not possess any effect on the optimal intensity of espionage actions,
which meets the solutions founded before in Equation (4.7), Equation (3.21) and Equation
(4.14).
As it happen in the last section, the intervention of the Regulator directly impose
the postponement of the optimal timing of S until it is optimal to the Society. In order
to do that, the Government enters in the market, with a subsidization of the consumers
in a exact measure that guarantees the efficiency of its activity and the equality of the
Social and S’s Optimal Timing, based on Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.18). Thus, the
endogenously level of t that is given by X∗t = X
∗∗ is equal to:
t∗ =
(a− c− 3δ)
10c− 6δ −
√
(a− c)2 − 6δ(a+ 6c+ 27
6
δ)
10c− 6δ (4.19)
As we said before, the regulator attempts to meet the maximum level of welfare to the
society. Although, this level of Welfare is achievable by the most efficient mean, i.e., the
government chooses the solution that is less-costly in order or achieve the same purpose,
ceteris paribus. Opposite to what happen with the social level of interception, the effect
of some the operative costs and vantage’s disparities is quite complex to understand based
on the analytical analysis of the Equation (4.19). Only the level maximum willingness to
pay of the consumers demonstrate a identified positive effect, i.e., as the consumers are
willing to pay more for the goods and services of the market when the supply is scarce,
the government apply larger subsidy margins in comparison with the market’s price. The
solution also might conclude that larger level income of the consumers or a more wealthier
economy that guarantees a larger availability of the consumers to pay a higher price for
the goods, ceteris paribus, is followed by larger level of public subsidization.
7For further detail, see section B
42
The Option to Spy: The Firm behaviour, Global Welfare and Policy Measures
4.3.3 Numerical Example
The relation between the role of R and S in this market, as well as the entrance of the
government with an active attitude change the situation of each agent in the market. The
consumers and the suppliers, with the efficient solution developed in the chapter 3 does
not acquire the maximum level of welfare. The demand for the efficiency by the companies
leads to a sacrifice of the social equity and utility of all agents in the market, in aggregate
terms. Based in the same context of the section 3.3, we compare the solution efficiently
optimum for S and R, as well as the best solution for the consumers and producers.
Taking into consideration the parameters’ assumptions of Table 3.3, the optimal
espionage solution for S translates into a optimal timing and penetration level of:
Output Value
X∗ 5.26309
p∗(X∗) 0.79323
Table 4.3: Efficient Solution for the parameters present in Table 3.3
With the intervention of the regulator, the total surplus of the market denotes extreme
importance, which change the dynamics of the market. In this way, based on the same
assumptions, the social optimal timing for S to incur in espionage and the optimal level
of quality or penetration is equal to:
Output Value
X∗∗ 5.57678
p∗∗(X∗∗) 0.793238
Table 4.4: Social Optimal Solution for the parameters present in Table 3.3
Comparing the results of Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, it is possible to identify the early
introduction of espionage activities by S in the efficient environment, but with a similar
level of quality of espionage instruments. These conclusions also were observed in the
theoretical analysis of the model. However, in terms of welfare, the efficient solution
grants a lower level, even in singular terms, for the consumers and producers, even in
aggregate terms. The implementation of a social optimum, with the postponement of
espionage activities with a similar level of penetration improve the social situation. As
we can see in the Table 4.5, the incremental rise of the surplus is even greater for the
suppliers than for the consumers.
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Efficient
Solution
(X∗, p∗∗(X∗)
Social Efficient
Solution
(X∗∗, p∗(X∗∗)
Incremental
Variation
∆X∗∗−X∗
Consumer Surplus - CS 602.563 638.478 35.9144
Producer Surplus - PS 607.46 643.667 36.2062
Social Surplus - W 1210.02 1282.14 72.1206
Table 4.5: Consumer, Producer and Social Surplus for the parameters present in Table 3.3
In order to implement this social equilibrium, the regulator should actively intervene
in the market because, in case of passive behaviour of this agent, the solution that will
be established in the market will be the efficient, once it is more beneficial for S. As
we see before, with the aim of approximate both timings, the efficient and social, the
Government might use consuming subsidies and/or provide counter espionage or defence
techniques to benefit of R. Both solutions direct influence the efficient timing, delaying
the decision of S to incur in espionage and intervene in both sides of the market.
In what respects to the investment in defence techniques, the use of this instrument
will guarantee a protection of the advantage of R, which translates in a more harmful
situation for S. In this way and based in Equation (4.15), the government, in order
to delay the entrance of espionage activities by S, should provide a total set of defence
instruments that accommodate a interception rate equal to 5.625%. Comparing with the
optimal value of penetration rate, the level of defence provided to R by public assistance
is much lower. It also should be noted that, as we said before, the rise of the protection
of the cost’s advantage of R is provided by the government, which will not bring any
additional cost of R. Also, these total set of techniques that guarantee a rise of the
safety of R delays the expected possibility of S to successfully acquire the advantageous
processes in its own productive process.
Output Value
X∗q 5.57678
p∗(X∗q ) 0.793238
q? 0.05625
Table 4.6: Defence Optimal Solution for the parameters present in Table 3.3
The possibility of direct intervention of the government is not only achievable by
the suppliers assistance. By the side of consumers, the regulator might subsidize the
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consumption of goods or services available in this specific market. As we refer in the
previous chapter, this theoretical assumption might also be sustained by the examples
that are present in the reality. Similarly to what is clear in the public contribution to the
larger defence of R, the consuming subsidy acts in the delaying of the efficient solution
until the moment that is optimal for the Society the concurrence in espionage activities.
Based on Equation (4.19), with the aim of directly actuates in the delaying of espionage
activities, the government should provide, based in the efficiency of its operations, a
subsidy equal to 7.43617% of the market’s price that vigorates8.
Output Value
X∗t 5.57678
p∗(X∗t ) 0.793238
t? 0.0743617
Table 4.7: Optimal Solution for the Consuming Subsidization, based on the parameters
present in Table 3.3
As we said before, the influence of t to the optimal level of efficient espionage is not
linear, as we might see in Equation (4.18). Based on the assumptions for the different
parameters, in a first stage, i.e., for values of subsidization lower than 25.1773% of the
market price, the subsidization positively influences the timing of efficient penetrate in
company R, in favour of the social interests. In other words, the public assistance in the
consumers’ purchase delay the efficient decision of S to spy. On other hand, to value
superior to 25.1773% the relation between the X∗ and t is negative, i.e., possible rises of
the subsidization of the demand directly contribute to a early implementation of spying
techniques of S.
In what concerns to the influence in the optimal proportion of the price subsidized by
the regulator, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 demonstrate the effect of productions costs and
disparity between the companies in t∗. In the first case, as we see before, the rise of the
production cost implies a lower subsidy of the government in this market. On the other
hand, the larger cost’s advantage of R against S will imply a larger subsidy of the state,
once S is in a more critical situation.
8The emphasis on the efficient operations of the government accrue on the double solution to equalize
both timings. Although, one of them guarantee the same result with lower costs for the government.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of Subsidy t∗ based on the values of δ
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to develop a model able to incorporate the managerial
decision of the enterprise to incur in espionage activities, based on the Real Options
Approach.
Empirically, the operations of corporate espionage are becoming each time more
frequently. The global competition, the political turmoil, the uncertainty about the future
are some concerns that are taken into attention for the enterprises, in the moment of
choosing which strategy should perform. The uncertain but irreversible consequences of
spy activities after its fulfilment and the flexibility of the managers to realize such actions
validate the use of Real Options Approach as method for our model.
The model implemented in this dissertation takes into consideration the unfavourable
position ex ante of the spied against the competition, once the structure of the production
are more expensive than the competition. The use of these activities comes as a solution
for the enterprise to increase its value and to be at the forefront of the market.
In the first stage, we implement a model based on the individual decision of the
company, concerned about the maximization of its value in the future. The use of spying
activities implies a trade-off between the costs of such action and the benefits of the
information acquired. Secondly, the efficiency of such decision will not lead to a larger
social equity in the market, i.e., the welfare of the society was compromised by the positive
decision of optimally incurring in espionage by the spied, both in timing and penetration
rate. In this way, it was necessary the introduction of a different agent, the government,
able to regulate the market and secure the interest of the consumers and suppliers. Thus,
the model predicted in the second stage had as purpose the maximization of the social
welfare, instead of the value of an individual firm.
Although, the disparity between the efficient and the social optimal timing created
advantages for the company to opt for efficient solution, regarding the interests of the
society. It was necessary an active attitude of the Regulator, via implementation of
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instruments able to equalize efficiency and equity. To achieve this balance, it was
implemented two different measures, in both sides of the market, namely the public
assistance of defence techniques of the firm spied and the consuming subsidization. The
intensity of these instruments guarantee the equality for the lowest possible cost.
The results of both models are conclusive. The cost structure of the production and
spying activity, as well as consumers’ preferences only influence the optimal time to incur
in spy actions. In other words, the growth of the industry’s costs of production and also
the costs of espionage leads uniquely to the postponement of espionage activities. The
intensity or the probability of successfully acquire information, captured by p, only is
influenced by the risk of the market. The rise of the uncertainty surrounding the market
anticipates the performance of these activities, but with a lower intensity and successful
probability of obtaining the cost-advantage of the competition. The empirical evidence
might indirectly corroborate such conclusions, once the high-tech industry, as well as
others which are characterized by a larger level of uncertainty detain a larger level of
registered actions of espionage.
On the other hand, the difference in the production costs between the enterprises
presented in the market, defined as δ in the model, negatively influence the optimal
timing of incurring in espionage, i.e., the greater the difference between the productions
costs of the enterprises, greater will be the need of implementing such actions to bridge
the costs’ differences.
Comparing the social and efficient timing, the social interest are compromised by the
early decision of spying dictated by the efficient solution. To protect the social interest, the
government active intervene in the market, with the endogenous determination of the level
of defence of cost advantage of the competition or the consuming subsidy implemented
(based on the equivalence of social and efficient optimal timings of espionage). Relatively
to the financing of the defence techniques, the rising of productions costs, as well as the
costs’ discrepancy between the companies imply a larger level if defence, captured by the
interception rate, q.
Although, the influence of the costs structure is not similar when it is considered the
subsidization of the consume. Captured by t, the proportion of the supported price by the
consumers that is subsidized by the government depended positively from the production
costs of the industry. In this way, the rising of production costs directly imply a lower
level of subsidization of the market demand. But, the larger cost advantage in the market
impose a opposite behaviour, i.e, the grater difference between the cost structure of the
spy firm and the competition contributes to a larger proportion of the subsidy.
The larger contribution of the model for the managerial theory and practice comes with
the social implications of espionage. Contrary to what happen in the previous literature,
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the implications of the espionage for society are not fixed. In other words, conditional to
the timing when such actions happen, the occurrence of espionage might benefit or damage
the social welfare. These position give a new perspective for the literature, complementing
both positions defended, either in defence of the economic advantages of this activity or in
opposition to them. Future Research over this topic might incide about the determination
of the optimal level of investment required to perform such activities, as well as a extension
of the model to an oligopolistic or perfect competition environment. The inclusion of
private techniques or reputational costs for the the firm which perform such activities
might also be another alternative for the future development of this model. Nevertheless,
it would be interest the development of the study of these actions once the decision of
incurring in espionage is always on the table for the enterprises.
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Appendix A
Efficient Model of Espionage
Costs-Environments for R and S
Non-Symmetric Costs
In case of non-success of espionage activities of S, both companies share a different cost
structure, with S producing with larger costs, c, and R with c− δ. Based on the inverse
demand of Equation (3.1), the profit flow of both firms is given by:
piR = QR(a− b(QS +QR)− (c− δ)) (A.1)
piS = QS(a− b(QS +QR)− c) (A.2)
Maximizing piR and piS in order to QR and QS, respectively, we are able to find the
optimal output of R and S to any level of quantity of the other competitor.
QR =
a− bQS − c+ δ
2b
(A.3)
QS =
a− bQR − c
2b
(A.4)
Equalizing both optimal levels of output for any given production of the market, the
optimal output in a equilibrium situation is given by:
QR =
a− c+ 2δ
3b
(A.5)
QS =
a− c− δ
3b
(A.6)
Replacing both equilibrium levels of production in the Equation (3.1), the optimal
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price is given by:
P =
a+ 2c− δ
3
(A.7)
With the establishment of the optimal market’s price and level of output for both
companies, the equilibrium profit flow for both companies is equal to:
piR =
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
(A.8)
piS =
(a− c− δ)2
9b
(A.9)
Symmetric Costs
In case of success of espionage activities of S, both companies share a similar cost
structure, with both companies producing to a cost of c−δ. Based on the inverse demand
of Equation (3.1), the profit flow of both firms is given by:
piR = QR(a− b(QS +QR)− (c− δ)) (A.10)
piS = QS(a− b(QS +QR)− (c− δ)) (A.11)
Maximizing piR and piS in order to QR and QS, respectively, we are able to find the
optimal output of R and S to any level of quantity of the other competitor.
QR =
a− bQS − c+ δ
2b
(A.12)
QS =
a− bQR − c+ δ
2b
(A.13)
Equalizing both optimal levels of output for any given production of the market, the
optimal output in a equilibrium situation is given by:
QR =
a− c+ δ
3b
(A.14)
QS =
a− c+ δ
3b
(A.15)
Replacing both equilibrium levels of production in the Equation (3.1), the optimal
price is given by:
P =
a+ 2c− 2δ
3
(A.16)
With the establishment of the optimal market’s price and level of output for both
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companies, the equilibrium profit flow for both companies is equal to:
piR =
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
(A.17)
piS =
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
(A.18)
Optimal Efficient Solution
Previously, we denote V (X) in Equation (3.4) as the value of S, dependent of the result
of the espionage activities performed against R.
V (X) = (1− p)(a− c− δ)
2
9b
X
r − α + p
(a− c+ δ)2
9b
X
r − α (A.19)
However, S will try to optimally decide in respect to the level of penetration rate, p.
Maximizing the difference between Equation (A.19) and the cost of espionage, presented
in Equation (3.5) with respect to p, the optimal penetration rate for any timing X is given
by:
p∗ = 1− 3
2
√
zb(r − α)
Xδ(a− c) (A.20)
Based on the studies of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the value of the option to invest
is, in this context given by Equation (3.13), where β follows a positive behaviour, as
it is defended in Equation (3.18). The value of the option previously refereed is result
from a simplification imposed by the ebsorbing condition (Equation (3.14)). However, to
determine the indifference situation of X∗ for the determination of the optimal Value of
S, it is required to employ to the remaining conditions, observed in Equation (3.15) and
Equation (3.16).
F (X∗) = V (X∗)−K(z, p) (A.21)
∂F (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗
=
∂V (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗
(A.22)
Substituting Equation (3.4) and Equation (3.5) in Equation (A.21) and Equation
(A.22), in respect to X∗, the optimal timing will be given by:
X∗ =
9bz(r − α)
4δ(a− c)
β2
(β − 1)2 (A.23)
Replacing the optimal timing of S to incur in espionage (Equation (A.23))in the
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optimal Penetration Rate (Equation (A.20), the optimal level of espionage techniques
for X∗ is:
p∗(X∗) =
1
β
(A.24)
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Appendix B
Social Model of Espionage
Cost Environment and influence in Consumer,
Producer and Total Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Based on Equation 4.1, the consumer surplus is directly influenced by the optimal level
produced by R and S.
CS =
b(QR +QS)
2
2
(B.1)
In this way, and based in a situation where S produces to a superior cost than R (S
produces to c while R produces to c− δ), we replace Equation (A.5) and Equation (A.6)
into Equation (B.1) in order to achieve the optimal amount of consumer surplus with a
non-symmetric structure of the costs in the market.
CS =
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
18b
(B.2)
On the other hand, when the market faces a symmetric constitution of the cost, i.e.,
the success of the espionage activities of S allow the firm to produce to c − δ, the same
cost than R, the consumer surplus suffers a shift. In order to translate that, we substitute
Equation (A.14) and Equation (A.15) into Equation (B.1).
CS =
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
(B.3)
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Producer Surplus
The producer surplus conceptualizes the total amount of value of the firms presented in
the market, in each moment.
PS =
∞∑
t=0
pii, i = {R, S} (B.4)
Based on a favourable cost situation for R, the producer surplus constitutes the sum of
the profit flow of each moment of both companies. In this way, we replace Equation (A.8)
and Equation (A.9) into Equation (B.4), that translates into the optimal producer surplus
of the market when both enterprises present different production costs, with vantage for
R.
PS =
(a− c− δ)2 + (a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
(B.5)
In a opposite situation, the equality in the cost’s structure of the market, the producer
surplus, as it happen in the consumer surplus, change. In order to translate this
modification, is is necessary to substitute Equation (A.17) and Equation (A.18) into
Equation (B.4).
PS =
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
(B.6)
Total Surplus
Previously, we refer that the total surplus of the society or the social surplus consists in
the surplus aggregated from all the agents that intervene in this market. Based on the
market assumptions of the model, the agents that perform a direct role in the market are
the consumers and the producers, which guarantee the totality of the surplus. Thus, in a
non-symmetric context, based on the structure of the production of S and R, the value
of total surplus is formed by the sum of Equation (B.2) and Equation (B.5).
TotalWelfare = ConsumerSurplus+ ProducerSurplus (B.7)
W =
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
18b
+
(a− c− δ)2 + (a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
W =
8δ(a− c) + 8(a− c)2 + 11δ2
18b
(B.8)
On opposite situation, the equality of the costs for both companies allow a alteration of
the total surplus, given by the new optimal amount produced by both companies. Based
on Equation (B.3) and Equation (B.6), we are able to determinate the new level of the
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total surplus.
W =
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
+
2(a− c+ δ)2
9b
W =
4(a− c+ δ)2
9b
(B.9)
Optimal Social Solution
As it was refereed for the value of the S in the chapter 3, the value of the social surplus also
depend the expected result of the espionage activities. In this way, the success, connected
with a penetration rate of p, leads to a cost’s symmetric environment, while the failure,
1−p, leads to the cost’s advantage of R. In this way, the value of the social surplus equal
to what is established in Equation (4.4).
In order to maximize the value of espionage activities, the regulator determinate the
optimal social penetration rate that guarantee the maximum level of social surplus. To
do that, it is necessary to maximize the difference between Equation (4.4) and the costs
of espionage, Equation (3.5) with respect to p, in order to achieve the optimal social level
of p to any level of X.
p∗∗ = 1− 3
√
2bz(r − α)√
bδXz(r − α)(8a− 8c− 3δ) (B.10)
Based on the Real Options Approach, the value of the option to invest in espionage,
present in Equation (3.13) is now calculated with W (X, p) with deterrence of V (X, p).
Taking into consideration the boundary conditions, with exception to the absorbing
condition (that is embedded in the definition of the nature of option to invest), it is
necessary to determine the indifference level of X∗∗.
F (X∗∗) = W (X∗∗)−K(z, p) (B.11)
∂F (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗∗
=
∂W (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗∗
(B.12)
Substituing Equation (4.4) and Equation (3.5) into Equation (B.11) and Equation
(B.12), the social optimal timing, X∗∗ is given by:
X∗∗ =
18bz(r − α)
δ(8a− 8c− 3δ)
β2
(β − 1)2 (B.13)
Replacing Equation (B.13) in the social optimal level of p, the optimal penetration
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rate for the optimal timing for the society is equal to:
p∗∗(X∗∗) =
1
β
(B.14)
Based on the value of Equation (B.13) and Equation (B.14), it is now possible to
determinate the value of the social welfare produced by the social solution, through the
substitution in Equation (4.4).
W (X∗∗, p∗∗) =
zβ(8(a− c)2 + 8δ(a− c)(β + 1) + δ2(11β − 3))
(8a− 8c− 3δ)(β − 1)2 (B.15)
Possible Actions of the Regulator
Defence Tactics
The public assistance of the government to protect the activity of R comes with the rise
of the defence techniques of the company, inputting a new parameter, the interception
rate, q. With the introduction of this parameter, the only substantial change comparing
with the model developed in chapter 3 is the weight of each scenario in the value of S.
Therefore, it is necessary to weigh the success of espionage activities for p(1−q) (replacing
p) and the failure of such actions for 1− p(1− q) (that substitutes 1− p).
Vq =
(
(1− p(1− q))(a− c− δ)
2
9b
+ p(1− q)(a− c+ δ)
2
9b
)
X
r − α (B.16)
Along side with the Value of S of Equation (B.16), the cost of espionage presented in
Equation (3.5), allows the maximization of difference between both with respect to the
penetration rate. In this way, the optimal level of p for any level of X in a context of
defence of R is given by:
p∗q = 1−
3bz(r − α)
2
√−bδ(q − 1)Xz(a− c)(r − α) (B.17)
Based on the boundary conditions that defines Real Options Approach in this context,
as it happen social and efficient solution, it is possible to define the value of the option to
invest and the indifference moment X∗q .
F (X)q = AX
β +
(a− c− δ)2
9b
X
r − α (B.18)
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F (X∗q ) = Vq(X
∗
q )−K(z, p) (B.19)
∂F (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗q
=
∂Vq(X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗q
(B.20)
Replacing Equation (B.16) and Equation (3.5) in Equation (B.19) and Equation
(B.20), it is possible to determine the optimal timing in defence context, X∗q .
X∗q =
9bz(r − α)
4δ(a− c)(1− q)
β2
(β − 1)2 (B.21)
With the optimal timing defined, it is now possible to determine the optimal
penetration rate for X∗q , by replacing Equation (B.21) into Equation (B.17).
p∗q(X
∗
q ) =
1
β
(B.22)
Consumption Subsidy
Based on the intervention of the state in the consumer’s preferences that impose a new
demand function, presented in Equation (4.16), the value of S and R is also dependent of
t. In this way, in a context of non-symmetric costs, the value of both companies is given
by:
piR = QR
(
a− b(QS +QR)
1− t − (c− δ)
)
(B.23)
piS = QS
(
a− b(QS +QR)
1− t − c
)
(B.24)
Maximizing piR and piS in order to QR and QS, respectively, we are able to find the
optimal output of R and S to any level of quantity of the other competitor.
QR =
a− bQR + ct− c+ δ − δt
2b
(B.25)
QS =
a− bQR + ct− c
2b
(B.26)
Equalizing both optimal levels of output for any given production of the market, the
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optimal output in a equilibrium situation is given by:
QR =
a+ (t− 1)(c− 2δ)
3b
(B.27)
QS =
a+ (t− 1)(c+ δ)
3b
(B.28)
Replacing both equilibrium levels of production in the Equation (4.16), the optimal
price is given by:
P =
(a− 2ct+ 2c+ δ(t− 1))
3
(B.29)
With the establishment of the optimal market’s price and level of output for both
companies, the equilibrium profit flow for both companies is equal to:
piR =
(a+ (t− 1)(c− 2δ))(a− c(2t+ 1) + δ(t+ 2))
9b
(B.30)
piS =
(a− c(2t+ 1) + δ(t− 1))(a+ (t− 1)(c+ δ))
9b
(B.31)
In case of success of espionage activities of S, both companies share a similar cost
structure, with both companies producing to a cost of c−δ. Based on the inverse demand
of equation (4.16), the profit flow of both firms is given by:
piR = QR
(
a− b(QS +QR)
1− t − (c− δ)
)
(B.32)
piS = QS
(
a− b(QS +QR)
1− t − (c− δ)
)
(B.33)
Maximizing piR and piS in order to QR and QS, respectively, we are able to find the
optimal output of R and S to any level of quantity of the other competitor.
QR =
a− bQS + ct− c+ δ − δt
2b
(B.34)
QS =
a− bQR + ct− c+ δ − δt
2b
(B.35)
Equalizing both optimal levels of output for any given production of the market, the
optimal output in a equilibrium situation is given by:
QR =
a− (1− t)(c− δ)
3b
(B.36)
QS =
a− (1− t)(c− δ)
3b
(B.37)
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Replacing both equilibrium levels of production in the Equation (4.16), the optimal
price is given by:
P =
1
3
(a− 2(t− 1)(c− δ)) (B.38)
With the establishment of the optimal market’s price and level of output for both
companies, the equilibrium profit flow for both companies is equal to:
piR =
(a+ (t− 1)(c− δ))(a− (2t+ 1)(c− δ))
9b
(B.39)
piS =
(a+ (t− 1)(c− δ))(a− (2t+ 1)(c− δ))
9b
(B.40)
We denote V (X)t as the Value of S in a context of subsidization of the consume,
dependent of the result of the espionage activities performed against R and the proportion
of the price of the product that is supported by the government.
V (X)t = (1− p)(a− c(2t+ 1) + δ(t− 1))(a+ (t− 1)(c+ δ))
9b
X
r − α +
p
(a+ (t− 1)(c− δ))(a− (2t+ 1)(c− δ))
9b
X
r − α (B.41)
However, S will try to optimally decide in respect to the quality of the espionage
techniques used, based on the level of penetration rate, p. Maximizing the difference
between Equation (B.41) and the cost of espionage, presented in Equation (3.5) with
respect to p, the optimal penetration rate for any timing X is given by:
p∗t = 1−
3bz(r − α)√−bδXz(r − α)(a(t− 4) + t(−5ct+ c+ 3δ(t− 1)) + 4c) (B.42)
Based on Real Options Approach, the value of the option to invest is, in this context
given by Equation (3.13). The value of the option previously refereed is result from
a simplification imposed by the absorbing condition (Equation (B.43)). However, to
determine the indifference situation of X∗t for the determination of the optimal value
of S, it is required to employ to the remaining conditions, refereed in Equation (B.44)
and Equation (B.45).
lim
X→0
Ft(X) = 0 (B.43)
Ft(X
∗
t ) = Vt(X
∗
t )−K(z, p) (B.44)
∂F (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗t
=
∂Vt(X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗t
(B.45)
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Substituting Equation (B.41) and Equation (3.5) in Equation (B.44) and Equation
(B.45), in respect to X∗t , the optimal timing will be given by:
X∗t =
9bz(r − α)
δ(a(4− t) + t(5ct− c+ 3δ(1− t))− 4c) (B.46)
Replacing the optimal timing of S to incur in espionage (Equation (B.46))in the
optimal penetration rate (Equation (B.42), the optimal level of espionage techniques for
X∗t is:
p∗t (X
∗
t ) =
1
β
(B.47)
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